Does the Constitution Require a Jury Finding That Prior Convictions Were Committed "On Occasions Different From One Another" for an Enhanced ACCA Sentence?

Petitioner Paul Erlinger pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). This crime was punishable by up to ten years imprisonment at the time of his offense. But, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a defendant is subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence if he “has three previous convictions…for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment under ACCA based on four prior convictions. The district court later vacated his sentence because three of those four priors no longer qualified as ACCA predicates. At resentencing, the government argued that petitioner be sentenced under ACCA based on four 1991 Indiana burglary convictions. Petitioner objected, relying on Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), that his prior convictions were not committed on occasions different from one another. He also argued that judicial fact-finding of this issue was prohibited by the Sixth Amendment and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2002), and objected to the court’s reliance on conviction records. The district court overruled petitioner’s objections and sentenced him under ACCA to 15 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that “Wooden expressly reserved the Sixth Amendment issue” and the court was, therefore, “bound by [its] [pre-Wooden] precedent,” which does not require the government to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner’s prior burglaries occurred on different occasions. The Court will now decide whether ACCA’s occasions clause requires a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]