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Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts.

  • Published In: Ratio Juris, 2023, v. 36, n. 4. P. 286 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Plunkett, David 3 of 3

Abstract

When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of "conceptual ethics" approach to thinking about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology). The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or "legal‐ish") concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or "legal‐ish") practices different from our current ones. In exploring this approach, I aim to help us better understand the landscape of philosophical issues about legal interpretation, including parts of it that I think have been underexplored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Ratio Juris. 2023/12, Vol. 36, Issue 4, p286
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Law
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0952-1917
  • DOI:10.1111/raju.12395
  • Accession Number:173586456
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Ratio Juris is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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