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Argumentative Representation and Democracy: A Critique of Alexy's Defense of Judicial Review of Legislation.

  • Published In: Ratio Juris, 2023, v. 36, n. 2. P. 160 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Buriticá‐Arango, Esteban; Gaviria‐Mira, Julián 3 of 3

Abstract

Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value of argumentative representation depends on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Ratio Juris. 2023/06, Vol. 36, Issue 2, p160
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Law
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0952-1917
  • DOI:10.1111/raju.12375
  • Accession Number:163852277
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Ratio Juris is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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