JOURNAL ARTICLE
Coordination by Code: Rethinking Antitrust Liability in the Age of AI Pricing.
Published In: Antitrust Magazine, 2025, v. 40, n. 1. P. 24 1 of 3
Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: WEINER, MICHAEL L.; BERGER, LEE F.; WEISIYU JIANG 3 of 3
Abstract
The article discusses the implications of AI pricing algorithms on antitrust scrutiny, particularly under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It highlights recent legal cases, such as *United States et al v. RealPage, Inc.* and *Gibson v. Cendyn Group LLC*, which explore whether the mutual use of AI tools among competitors can be interpreted as an agreement to coordinate pricing, even in the absence of explicit communication. The analysis suggests that the legal framework is evolving to address scenarios where algorithmic pricing may lead to tacit collusion, raising questions about liability based on user knowledge and intent. Additionally, California's recent amendment to the Cartwright Act broadens the scope of potential liability for algorithmic pricing coordination, indicating a legislative response to these emerging challenges. [Extracted from the article]
Additional Information
- Source:Antitrust Magazine. 2025/09, Vol. 40, Issue 1, p24
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:Law
- Publication Date:2025
- ISSN:0162-7996
- Accession Number:190367487
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