Prosecution Deferred, Prosecution Exempt: On the Interests of (In)Justice in the Non-Trial Resolution of Transnational Corporate Bribery.

This article examines how judges in England and Wales justify the approval of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) in cases of transnational corporate bribery, focusing on the discursive mechanisms underpinning these decisions. DPAs are non-trial resolutions that allow corporations implicated in bribery to avoid prosecution by meeting certain conditions, such as cooperation, financial penalties, and corporate reform, with judicial oversight ensuring they serve the "interests of justice." The analysis identifies three key judicial rationalizations: deviance elastication (stretching the threshold of permissible corporate wrongdoing), corporate dissociation (distinguishing the current corporate entity from past misconduct), and anticipatory offsetting (weighing potential collateral harms of prosecution on companies, employees, and markets). The article highlights that these flexible justifications often result in corporations being effectively exempted from prosecution, raising questions about legal fairness, enforcement efficacy, and the legitimacy of negotiated corporate justice within the UK's anti-bribery regulatory framework.