A Theory of Power Structure and Institutional Compatibility: China versus Europe Revisited.

The article develops a two-dimensional power-structure framework to analyze institutional differences between imperial China and premodern Europe, focusing on (1) the degree of absolute power held by the Ruler over Elites and People, and (2) the asymmetry in everyday power and rights between Elites and People. It finds that a more absolutist Ruler (with stronger absolute power) tends to prefer a more balanced relationship between Elites and People, reconciling seemingly contradictory historical views: China had stronger ruler absolutism but a more symmetric Elite–People relationship, whereas Europe had weaker absolutism but greater Elite–People asymmetry. Using a game-theoretical model, the study shows that this combination stabilizes autocratic rule by fostering a political alliance between the Ruler and People, deterring challenges from Elites or external challengers. The framework helps interpret specific institutions such as China's civil service exam and European urban charters, explains variations within and between these societies, and aligns with empirical evidence that autocratic rule was more stable in imperial China during the 9th to 14th centuries.