Analysing Exclusive Dealing in Two-Sided Markets: Marketplaces for Video Games.

This article focuses on the analysis of exclusive dealing (ED) in two-sided markets within the context of European Union competition law, using the entry of Epic Games Store (EGS) into the online PC game distribution market dominated by Steam as a case study. It develops a theoretical model and employs structural estimation with publicly available data to assess how ED can serve as a strategic tool for entrants to overcome network effects and attract both buyers and sellers, potentially increasing consumer welfare despite entry being unprofitable initially. The findings suggest that ED by entrants, unlike by incumbents, may not indicate anticompetitive conduct and that competition induced by EGS’s entry led to reduced fees on Steam and overall welfare gains. The article emphasizes the importance of case-specific economic analysis in complex digital multi-sided markets and presents a replicable empirical framework for evaluating ED’s effects on market entry and consumer welfare.