Who Lost Afghanistan? Samuel Huntington and the Decline of Strategic Thinking.

This article analyzes the strategic failures of the U.S. military withdrawal and political collapse in Afghanistan, attributing them primarily to a deficient strategic mindset shaped by an overreliance on Samuel Huntington's 1957 civil–military relations theory of objective control. It argues that Huntington's model, which strictly separates civilian political leadership from military operational command, inadequately addresses the intertwined political and military challenges of modern conflicts like Afghanistan, leading to four key issues: confusion over objectives, disjointed policy formulation, vision blindness with mismatched ends-ways-means, and a lack of military ownership for strategic outcomes. The article recommends reforming professional military education (PME) to incorporate Morris Janowitz's alternative civil–military relations theory, which emphasizes the political education of military leaders, and adopting systemic rather than systematic thinking to better integrate political and military considerations in strategy. Without such changes, the article warns, future U.S. engagements in complex conflicts risk repeating similar strategic failures.