Veridicalism and Scepticism.

The article critically examines veridicalism, the epistemological view that ordinary beliefs about external objects can constitute knowledge even under global sceptical scenarios—such as being a brain in a vat or a victim of Descartes' demon—and that this view refutes the standard sceptical argument denying such knowledge. While veridicalism rejects the premise that one must know the falsity of sceptical hypotheses to know ordinary objects exist, the article argues that it fails to solve the sceptical problem because it does not provide substantively more knowledge about the external world than scepticism does; rather, it reformulates the problem by redefining what counts as an ordinary object (e.g., "thin tables" versus "thick tables"). The author further contends that veridicalism's purported solution amounts to a shift in terminology without alleviating the fundamental ignorance about the ultimate nature or cause of our experiences, and that a genuine solution must address the core sceptical premise concerning our ignorance of whether sceptical scenarios obtain.