JOURNAL ARTICLE
Naïve Realism and (Some) High‐Level Illusions.
Published In: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, 2025, v. 91, n. 4. P. 1 1 of 3
Database: Humanities Source Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: Başoğlu, Yavuz Recep 3 of 3
Abstract
So‐called high‐levelists about perceptual experience claim that we can perceive not only low‐level properties such as colour and shape but also high‐level properties such as natural kind properties. Although various proponents of opposing theories of perception agree on this high‐levelist view, it is seldom asked which theories of perception have resources to account for high‐level perception. In this paper, I raise this question for naïve realism and argue that if perceptual experiences present "high‐level" properties, certain high‐level illusions pose a problem for naïve realism. Specifically, I maintain that the naïve realist's strategies for addressing illusions of low‐level properties are unpromising when it comes to addressing illusions of high‐level properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Additional Information
- Source:Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy. 2025/08, Vol. 91, Issue 4, p1
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:Literature and Writing
- Publication Date:2025
- ISSN:00405825
- DOI:10.1111/theo.70020
- Accession Number:187617181
- Copyright Statement:Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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