If the I is a Point, How Can It have a Direction? Fichte's Two-Stage Conceptualization of the Absolute I.

Fichte claims in Section 5 of the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (GWL) that the absolute I contains a difference between two directions. In this paper, I argue that this specific claim complements, rather than contradicts, his general position in Section 1, according to which the absolute I is a simple identity or a point. I first show that we can identify a version of what I call Fichte's Two-Directions Theory in texts written both before and after the GWL. I term this version his Two-Series Theory. Drawing on this reading, I demonstrate, in contrast to previous research, that Fichte consistently formulates the absolute I in a twofold manner: as a pure act that precedes any difference and as a proposition that contains a relation. I further argue that Fichte's treatment of the absolute I as a simple unity and as a unity of two directions maps onto two stages within his philosophical investigation. On my account, Fichte seeks to comprehend the absolute I by considering the I's activity both as it is in itself and as it presents itself to thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]