Education, epistemic justice, and truthfulness: Miranda Fricker interviewed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. Thompson.

This article focuses on the concept of epistemic injustice, as developed by moral philosopher Miranda Fricker, and its implications for education. Fricker distinguishes two primary forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, where prejudice leads to wrongful credibility deficits, and hermeneutical injustice, where marginalized individuals lack the resources to make sense of their social experiences. She discusses how these injustices manifest in educational settings, affecting classroom dynamics, teacher expectations, and student participation, and emphasizes the importance of cultivating epistemic virtues—such as truthfulness and intellectual openness—in educators and students to promote epistemic justice. The article also highlights ongoing scholarly efforts to expand the framework of epistemic injustice to include issues like unequal epistemic attention and communicative injustices within educational contexts.