Nietzschean Perspectivism: Representation and Values.

This article examines Nietzsche's perspectivism, emphasizing that all representations are inherently perspectival and shaped by underlying values, affects, and drives, thereby rejecting the possibility of absolute, value-free representations. It contrasts Nietzsche's view with Bernard Williams's distinction between internal and external reasons in practical reasoning and his acceptance of an absolute conception of the world in theoretical reasoning, highlighting Nietzsche's rejection of a strict separation between practical and theoretical cognition. Drawing on examples from philosophy and science, including Helen Longino's account of scientific objectivity as reliant on diverse, value-laden perspectives, the article argues that even scientific concepts are influenced by evaluative commitments. Ultimately, it situates Nietzsche's perspectivism within his genealogical critique of cognition and his suspicion that ideals of cognitive purity and absolute knowledge reflect ascetic self-denial incompatible with human finitude.