Plato on the Reasons for and the Value of Friendship (Philia).

The article examines whether Plato, traditionally viewed as an advocate of impartial ethics in the *Republic*, can also be seen as a pioneer of an ethics of partiality, particularly through his treatment of filial piety and friendship in the *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, and *Lysis*. It highlights tensions between impartial justice and partial obligations, such as the priority of filial and civic piety that exempts sons from prosecuting their fathers or citizens from disobeying unjust laws. In the *Lysis*, Plato's concept of friendship (philia) is explored beyond a purely utilitarian basis, suggesting that friendship involves moral grounds and shared orientation toward a common good, which may justify partial ethical considerations. The article concludes that Plato acknowledges the special moral value of personal relationships, integrating partiality within his broader ethical framework.