Taking Dworkin's Legal Monism Seriously.

This review essay critically examines Cormac Mac Amhlaigh's *New Constitutional Horizons*, focusing on his pluralistic analytic legal theory addressing the individuation of legal systems amid transnational law and his pluralistic account of constitutionalism as an interpretive concept. While endorsing Mac Amhlaigh's interpretive, Dworkinian approach to constitutionalism and the unity of political values, the essay challenges his analytic legal theory's commitment to legal pluralism. It argues that Mac Amhlaigh's reliance on a positivist, criterial methodology to individuate legal systems conflicts with Ronald Dworkin's thesis of the unity of value, which supports a monistic jurisprudence viewing municipal and international law as integrated parts of a single normative order. The essay further situates this debate within the Hart-Kelsen discourse on legal monism, contending that Dworkin's circular monism offers a more coherent and plausible framework than Kelsen's linear monism or Hart's pluralism, especially regarding the legitimacy and interpretation of transnational legal authority.