Was Paul Hirst ever a Deweyan?

This article examines the intellectual development of Paul Hirst’s two major educational theories, contrasting his early rationalist theory of liberal education with his later neo-Aristotelian theory centered on social practices. Hirst’s early theory emphasized the cultivation of a rational mind through initiation into distinct forms of theoretical knowledge, but he later rejected this approach due to foundational circularities involving the concepts of mind, knowledge, and experience, and an inadequate account of “concept.” His later theory shifted focus to practical reason and education as initiation into rational social practices, aligning superficially with John Dewey’s pragmatism but differing fundamentally in epistemological foundations. Despite similarities in valuing social practices and a flourishing life, Hirst’s later theory maintains a commitment to distinct forms of knowledge and social constructionism, distinguishing it from Dewey’s empirical naturalism; thus, Hirst was never a Deweyan pragmatist.