JOURNAL ARTICLE

What Is Nietzschean Weakness of Will?

  • Published In: Monist, 2024, v. 107, n. 4. P. 364 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Lambert, Thomas 3 of 3

Abstract

This article examines Friedrich Nietzsche's conception of strength and weakness of will, challenging the common assumption that he equates weakness solely with akrasia—acting against one's better judgment. Instead, Nietzsche primarily associates weakness of will with irresoluteness, understood as the failure to persist in one's intentions over time. Nietzsche explains strength of will as the dominance and coordination of an individual's drives, providing a stable "center of gravity," whereas weakness arises from a lack of such dominance, leading to oscillation between competing intentions. This interpretation aligns Nietzsche's view with contemporary theories emphasizing diachronic failures of will and suggests his account unifies different forms of agential failure through the structural relations among drives.

Additional Information

  • Source:Monist. 2024/10, Vol. 107, Issue 4, p364
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Literature and Writing
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:0026-9662
  • DOI:10.1093/monist/onae020
  • Accession Number:179812040
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