How Do Consumers React to Ads That Meddle in Out-Party Primaries?

This article examines consumer reactions to "meddle ads," a political advertising strategy where candidates support weak or extreme opponents in the opposing party's primaries to improve their own chances in general elections. Through seven main studies and ten supplemental studies involving over 7,700 participants, the research finds that consumers generally display strong aversion to meddle ads, penalizing candidates who use them by donating less, holding more negative attitudes, and being less likely to vote for them. This aversion is driven by three key concerns: outcome-related risks (fear of losing elections), system-related risks (erosion of trust in democracy), and negative perceptions of candidate character. The research also shows that candidates face less backlash when meddle ads are financed by outside groups rather than themselves, and that justifications appealing to winning or defending democracy can mitigate negative consumer responses. These findings contribute to political marketing literature by introducing the concept of system-related risk and provide practical guidance for political marketers regarding the use and communication of meddle ads.