Reducing and Managing Risk: The Dimensions of Strong Ceasefires in Intra-State Conflict.

This article develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the strength and risk of ceasefires in intra-state conflicts, based on insights from ceasefire practitioners. It identifies three key determinants of ceasefire risk: the objective quality of design (how well arrangements reduce and manage risk), the subjective quality of design (the parties’ satisfaction with these arrangements), and the political will of the parties to resolve the conflict through negotiations. The framework highlights exceptions to the common assumption that strong objective design leads to strong subjective design and durable ceasefires, notably in cases of "spurious agreements" signed under duress without genuine commitment, and preliminary ceasefires that are often intentionally weak due to low trust. The article illustrates these concepts through case studies of ceasefires in Sudan, Darfur, and South Sudan, emphasizing the importance of party ownership, contextual tailoring of ceasefire mechanisms, and the interplay between political will and design quality in determining ceasefire durability.