JOURNAL ARTICLE

"The Great Doctrine Disaster": Reform, Reaction, and Mechanization in the British Army, 1919-1939.

Published In: Journal of Military History, 2023, v. 87, n. 3. P. 599 1 of 3
Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: Searle, Alaric 3 of 3

Abstract

Historians have argued that Britain lost its early lead in developing mechanized formations in the interwar period due to financial pressures, interarm rivalry, poor tank design, and the misjudgments of tank enthusiasts. A systematic examination of armor doctrine, however, demonstrates that British approaches were coherent and innovative until 1935. Progress was derailed by the suppression of the "Tank Training" (1935) manual and the decision to mechanize the cavalry rather than expand the Royal Tank Corps. Coordination between manuals of arms of service and the field service regulations was abandoned, moreover, in favor of multiple training pamphlets. The result was the "Great Doctrine Disaster," which compounded false assumptions about tank design, tactics, and future war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

Source:Journal of Military History. 2023/07, Vol. 87, Issue 3, p599
Document Type:Article
Subject Area:Military History and Science
Publication Date:2023
ISSN:0899-3718
Accession Number:164409915
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