Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying.

This article examines how corporate directors serving on public charity boards influence the lobbying behavior of these charities to align more closely with connected firms' corporate interests. Using detailed data linking IRS Form 990 filings, corporate board memberships, and lobbying disclosures from 1999 to 2017, the study finds that charities with corporate directors spend significantly more on lobbying efforts that benefit their connected firms, independent of direct corporate donations. The analysis employs various robustness checks, including difference-in-differences models around director turnovers and regulatory changes such as the 2013 New York Nonprofit Revitalization Act, and shows that connected charity lobbying is stronger for firms facing greater competition, better corporate governance, and higher political risk. Furthermore, firms benefit politically from these connections through increased government procurement contracts, while charities gain greater access to funding, suggesting a reciprocal relationship. The findings highlight corporate director appointments to charities as a complementary and less-recognized channel of corporate political influence, with implications for nonprofit governance and transparency policies.