The Election Effect: Democratic Leaders in Inter-Group Conflict.

The article investigates the "election effect," a phenomenon whereby the experience of being democratically elected alters leaders’ behavior in inter-group competitive contexts, such as international conflicts. Using an online laboratory experiment involving contest games that simulate zero-sum inter-group competition, the study finds that democratically elected leaders exert significantly greater effort—measured by costly investments to win—than both randomly selected leaders and individuals acting alone. This increased effort stems from intensified in-group identification and a heightened sense of obligation to voters, which simultaneously amplifies hostility toward out-groups, leading to potentially welfare-reducing overexertion in conflicts. The research distinguishes this election effect from selection effects (differences in who becomes leader) and institutional incentives, concluding that the psychological impact of being elected accounts for the majority of the increased effort. These findings suggest that while democratic elections improve group welfare in intra-group settings, they may exacerbate costly competition and conflict at the international level.