Do Vacancies Hurt Federal Agency Performance?

This article examines the impact of persistent vacancies in Senate-confirmed presidential appointment (PAS) positions on the performance of U.S. federal executive agencies, using data from the Trump administration and a 2020 survey of federal executives. The findings indicate that agencies experiencing long-term vacancies (e.g., 3–4 years) report significantly lower self-assessed performance—about one standard deviation below agencies with confirmed leadership—attributed to reduced long-term planning, lower morale among career professionals, and diminished investment by key political stakeholders. The study distinguishes the effects of vacancy length from leadership turnover and controls for potential confounders, suggesting that vacancies, rather than turnover, are correlated with poorer agency outcomes. While acknowledging limitations such as reliance on self-reported data and cross-sectional design, the article highlights the broader implications of appointment delays and political dysfunction for administrative effectiveness and governance.