JOURNAL ARTICLE

Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly.

  • Published In: Managerial & Decision Economics, 2023, v. 44, n. 1. P. 58 1 of 3

  • Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Cao, Hang; Wang, Leonard F. S. 3 of 3

Abstract

This paper investigates optimal zoning of two managerial firms in an unconstrained linear city. Comparing with the case in which firms are not managerial type, the strategic delegation increases the incentives of one firm to locate farther from the rival. Then, a welfare function is introduced to highlight zoning regulation as an influential competition policy tool. Depending on the regulator's objective function and the timing of location choice, we provide a new mechanism that allows the regulator to attain the optimal locations of managerial firms and can lead to strong or weak competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Managerial & Decision Economics. 2023/01, Vol. 44, Issue 1, p58
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Politics and Government
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0143-6570
  • DOI:10.1002/mde.3666
  • Accession Number:160812457
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Managerial & Decision Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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