JOURNAL ARTICLE

Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm.

  • Published In: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell), 2024, v. 55, n. 4. P. 684 1 of 3

  • Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Anderson, Simon; Bedre Defolie, Özlem 3 of 3

Abstract

We model a platform controlling the variety and prices of the products it hosts via a percentage fee on sellers and choosing whether to sell its own products (hybrid mode). We derive a mixed market demand system for differentiated products with monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product range. The hybrid platform steers consumers toward its products by charging higher seller fees than pure marketplace. This "insidious steering" intensifies the larger the platform's product footprint. Hybrid mode harms consumers compared to pure marketplace unless fringe entry is sufficiently inelastic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell). 2024/12, Vol. 55, Issue 4, p684
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Politics and Government
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:0741-6261
  • DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12478
  • Accession Number:181730982
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Looking to go deeper into this topic? Look for more articles on EBSCOhost.