The Illusion of Nuclear Deterrence.
Published In: Foreign Affairs, 2026, v. 105, n. 1. P. 207 1 of 3
Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: SANDERS-ZAKRE, ALICIA 3 of 3
Abstract
The article discusses the argument against the reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe, challenging the notion that the U.S. nuclear umbrella has effectively deterred conflict. It highlights that historical conflicts between nuclear states, such as India and Pakistan, suggest that nuclear deterrence may not be a reliable safeguard. The author advocates for European governments to join the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which aims to eliminate nuclear weapons, noting that several countries and local governments have already expressed support for this initiative. Public opinion polls indicate significant opposition in various European nations to developing their own nuclear arsenals or hosting U.S. nuclear weapons. [Extracted from the article]
Additional Information
- Source:Foreign Affairs. 2026/01, Vol. 105, Issue 1, p207
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:Power and Energy
- Publication Date:2026
- ISSN:0015-7120
- Accession Number:190321899
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