JOURNAL ARTICLE

Who's Afraid of the Base-Rate Fallacy?

  • Published In: Philosophy of Science, 2025, v. 92, n. 2. P. 453 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Dethier, Corey 3 of 3

Abstract

This paper evaluates the back-and-forth between Mayo, Howson, and Achinstein over whether classical statistics commits the base-rate fallacy. I show that Mayo is correct to claim that Howson's arguments rely on a misunderstanding of classical theory. I then argue that Achinstein's refined version of the argument turns on largely undefended epistemic assumptions about "what we care about" when evaluating hypotheses. I end by suggesting that Mayo's positive arguments are no more decisive than her opponents': even if correct, they are unlikely to compel anyone not already sympathetic to the classical picture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Philosophy of Science. 2025/04, Vol. 92, Issue 2, p453
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Psychology
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0031-8248
  • DOI:10.1017/psa.2024.39
  • Accession Number:185035747
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