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Against the inside out argument1.

  • Published In: Analytic Philosophy, 2024, v. 65, n. 2. P. 187 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Seymour, Amy 3 of 3

Abstract

Bailey (2021) offers a clever argument for the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility based on the nature of intrinsic intentions. The argument is mistaken on two counts. First, it is invalid. Second, even setting that first point aside, the argument proves too much: we would be blameworthy in paradigm cases of non‐blameworthiness. I conclude that we cannot reason from intentions to responsibility solely from the "inside out"—our possessing a blameworthy intention cannot tell us whether this intention is also blameworthy in deterministic worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Analytic Philosophy. 2024/06, Vol. 65, Issue 2, p187
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:2153-9596
  • DOI:10.1111/phib.12275
  • Accession Number:177190734
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Analytic Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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