Enthymemes, Doxa, and the Problem of Elided Syllogism.

This article examines the concept of the enthymeme, a rhetorical form of deductive reasoning distinct from the formal syllogism, focusing on its meaning, function, and role in persuasion. It argues that enthymemes rely on doxastic knowledge—commonly held beliefs or opinions (doxa)—rather than epistemic or certain knowledge (episteme), and that their persuasive power depends on the interaction between rhetor and audience, who collaboratively fill in unstated premises based on shared cultural understandings. The article addresses scholarly controversies regarding the enthymeme’s definition, its probabilistic nature, and the audience’s role in constructing meaning, ultimately proposing that enthymemes serve as a critical site where rhetoric, ideology, and power intersect. It suggests that further study of enthymemes and doxa can illuminate how rhetorical persuasion operates in social, political, and international contexts, including discourse by dominant and marginalized groups.