Basic racial realism, social constructionism, and the ordinary concept of race.
Published In: Journal of Social Philosophy, 2023, v. 54, n. 2. P. 236 1 of 3
Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: Griffith, Aaron M. 3 of 3
Abstract
(AND BLACK, AND MIXED RACE, AND...) If this constructionist response is successful, then it undermines the claim that social constructionism about race runs afoul of our ordinary concept of race. Joshua Glasgow and Jonathan M. Woodward ([5]) have proposed a new account of the metaphysics of race, which they call "basic racial realism." However, the constructionist can say that certain visible traits are necessary and essential to race - qua conceptually nonnegotiable of race - without also thinking they are sufficient to determine or ground the existence of races as kinds. What I makes i race real, then, need not be entirely social on such a constructionist view; social factors help unify races into kinds, even if there are other requirements for the existence of races. [Extracted from the article]
Additional Information
- Source:Journal of Social Philosophy. 2023/06, Vol. 54, Issue 2, p236
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
- Publication Date:2023
- ISSN:0047-2786
- DOI:10.1111/josp.12470
- Accession Number:164094886
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