Absence of evidence against belief as credence 1.

The article critically examines Jane Friedman's 2013 argument against the "Extreme Views" in doxastic attitudes, which identify belief as credence 1, disbelief as credence 0, and suspension of judgment as any precise credence strictly between 0 and 1. Friedman contends that there are cases where a credence of 0 is epistemically required while suspension is still permissible, challenging these views. The critique identifies two key issues undermining Friedman's argument: it conflates two distinct notions of epistemic rationality (permission by evidential state versus requirement by other doxastic attitudes) and relies on two incompatible kinds of evidential absence (a "mysterious" absence lacking information about possibilities versus an "uncountable" absence involving knowledge of an uncountably infinite partition of propositions). These distinctions show that the argument's premises do not coherently support its conclusion, leaving the Extreme Views unrefuted on Friedman's grounds.