JOURNAL ARTICLE

Lying: revisiting the 'intending to deceive' condition.

  • Published In: Analysis, 2023, v. 83, n. 2. P. 249 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Krstić, Vladimir 3 of 3

Abstract

This article focuses on refining the philosophical analysis of deceptive lying by examining cases traditionally viewed as lies not intended to deceive. It argues that many such lies actually involve sophisticated forms of intentional deception, including oblique (indirect) intentions to deceive, meta-deception about the liar's intentions, sustaining false beliefs, and participating in deception alongside others. The author proposes a revised condition (Lr) for lying that expands the standard deceptionist account to include these nuanced intentions, thereby clarifying the boundary between deceptive and non-deceptive lies. This refined analysis aims to better capture the complexity of how lies function in communication without claiming that all lies are intended to deceive.

Additional Information

  • Source:Analysis. 2023/04, Vol. 83, Issue 2, p249
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0003-2638
  • DOI:10.1093/analys/anac099
  • Accession Number:172954778
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