Truth from the Agent Point of View.

This article defends a novel pragmatist account of truth called "agential truth," inspired by Hilary Putnam, which holds that inquirers treat truth-apt claims as accountable to a shared target independent of any individual or community perspective. This view addresses challenges posed by deflationary and relativist accounts, such as those of Richard Rorty, by emphasizing that genuine disagreement and rational inquiry depend on assuming a common, independent standard that all participants aim to get right. The agential account aligns with and extends contemporary pragmatist theories, notably those of Huw Price and Cheryl Misak, by explaining why the norm of truth exerts a compelling normative force and why truth cannot be reduced to mere justification. Ultimately, the article argues that this pragmatist perspective converges on a version of the correspondence theory of truth understood not as a metaphysical absolute but as an independence grounded within the practices of inquiry themselves.