ON LIVING THE TESTIMONIAL SCEPTIC'S LIFE: CAN TESTIMONIAL SCEPTICISM BE DISMISSED?

The article critically examines the widespread assumption within contemporary epistemology of testimony that testimonial scepticism—specifically scepticism about testimonial knowledge (STK)—can be dismissed without serious engagement. It distinguishes STK from scepticism about testimonial justification (STJ) and argues that, unlike other sceptical positions such as global or external-world scepticism, STK cannot be validly dismissed on traditional grounds including unlivability, non-believability, or Moorean common-sense responses. Furthermore, the article contends that STK does not entail other dismissible sceptical views and that cognitive limitations do not justify ignoring it, highlighting that some languages even grammatically encode distinctions between testimonial and non-testimonial knowledge. The conclusion emphasizes that the neglect of testimonial scepticism and the assumption of its dismissibility represent significant shortcomings in current epistemological debates, particularly those between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of testimony.