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Humes definitions of virtue.

  • Published In: Nous (0029-4624), 2025, v. 59, n. 3. P. 729 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Qu, Hsueh 3 of 3

Abstract

Hume offers not one, but two definitions of virtue: a more famous one in terms of usefulness or agreeability to the self or to others, and a second in terms of eliciting approbation or disapprobation from spectators. Some scholars endorse the former definition as the more fundamental one; others endorse the latter as more fundamental. This paper argues that neither definition is more fundamental than the other. The two definitions are distinct but complementary, in that they have to rely on each other in various ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Nous (0029-4624). 2025/09, Vol. 59, Issue 3, p729
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0029-4624
  • DOI:10.1111/nous.12531
  • Accession Number:187456409
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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