JOURNAL ARTICLE

Moral Contingentism.

  • Published In: Philosophy Compass, 2025, v. 20, n. 5. P. 1 1 of 3

  • Database: Humanities Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Cannon, N. D. 3 of 3

Abstract

This paper surveys a number of views that fall under the name moral contingentism, the position in metaethics that claims that the fundamental ethical facts are metaphysically contingent. In other words, the fundamental ethical facts are true in some worlds, but not all. I look at three kinds of contingentism: law‐based contingentism, particularist contingentism, and nonseparationism. In each case, I outline the relevant view, give reasons we might find it attractive, and then discuss aspects of the view that need closer attention. The upshot of this paper is that contingentism is a live and interesting position in metaethics and has the potential to impact debates across the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Philosophy Compass. 2025/05, Vol. 20, Issue 5, p1
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:17479991
  • DOI:10.1111/phc3.70036
  • Accession Number:185453161
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