What Is Nietzschean Weakness of Will?
Published In: Monist, 2024, v. 107, n. 4. P. 364 1 of 3
Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: Lambert, Thomas 3 of 3
Abstract
The notions of strength and weakness of will appear at central junctures in Nietzsche's philosophy, figuring, for example, into his critique of modernity (BGE 212) and his engagement with the free will debate (BGE 21). Despite the centrality of these notions for Nietzsche's philosophical project, little scholarly attention has been devoted to examining how Nietzsche actually conceives of strength and weakness of will. Instead, it is commonly assumed that Nietzsche simply follows his philosophical predecessors in identifying weakness with akrasia. In this paper, I challenge this reading, arguing that the primary kind of agential failure that Nietzsche associates with weakness is irresoluteness , understood as the failure to persist in one's intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Additional Information
- Source:Monist. 2024/10, Vol. 107, Issue 4, p364
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
- Publication Date:2024
- ISSN:0026-9662
- DOI:10.1093/monist/onae020
- Accession Number:179812040
- Copyright Statement:Copyright of Monist is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Looking to go deeper into this topic? Look for more articles on EBSCOhost.