Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.

  • Published In: Metaphilosophy, 2023, v. 54, n. 1. P. 119 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Perrine, Timothy 3 of 3

Abstract

According to Universal Epistemic Deontology, all of our doxastic attitudes are open to deontological evaluations of obligation and permissibility. This view thus implies that we are responsible for all of our doxastic attitudes. But many philosophers have puzzled over whether we could be so responsible. This paper explores whether this puzzle can be resolved, and Universal Epistemic Deontology defended, by appealing to a view of responsibility it calls the Revelatory View. On that view, an agent is responsible for something when it reveals the kind of person the agent is. The paper explores four ways of developing the Revelatory View and argues that none of the views ultimately defends Universal Epistemic Deontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Metaphilosophy. 2023/01, Vol. 54, Issue 1, p119
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0026-1068
  • DOI:10.1111/meta.12597
  • Accession Number:161967787
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