The inefficacy objection and new ethical veganism.

  • Published In: Journal of Social Philosophy, 2025, v. 56, n. 2. P. 340 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Schwarz, Lucia 3 of 3

Abstract

The article focuses on the inefficacy objection to ethical veganism, which argues that individual dietary choices do not significantly impact meat production or its ethical implications. The author proposes a revised understanding of ethical veganism, termed "new ethical veganism," which asserts that being vegan is morally good without necessarily being obligatory. This position allows for various interpretations, including the notions of supererogation, virtue, and imperfect duty, and suggests that responses to the inefficacy objection may better support new ethical veganism than traditional views. The article emphasizes the need for philosophical exploration of these concepts to enhance the discourse on animal ethics and consumer choices. [Extracted from the article]

Additional Information

  • Source:Journal of Social Philosophy. 2025/06, Vol. 56, Issue 2, p340
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0047-2786
  • DOI:10.1111/josp.12514
  • Accession Number:185816562
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