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Deductive Inference and Mental Agency.

  • Published In: Analytic Philosophy, 2026, v. 67, n. 1. P. 25 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Peacocke, Christopher 3 of 3

Abstract

To give a good account of deductive inference, we need to recognise two new relations, one in the realm of contents, the other in the psychological realm of mental action. When these new relations are properly coordinated, they can supply an account of what it is for a thinker to be making a deductive inference. The account endorses the condition that in deductive reasoning, a thinker must take the premises to support the conclusion. The account is distinguished from the positions of Broome, Ryle, and Wright. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Analytic Philosophy. 2026/03, Vol. 67, Issue 1, p25
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Religion and Philosophy
  • Publication Date:2026
  • ISSN:2153-9596
  • DOI:10.1111/phib.12360
  • Accession Number:191428800
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