JOURNAL ARTICLE

Political alienation and voter mobilization in elections.

  • Published In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023, v. 25, n. 3. P. 515 1 of 3

  • Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Grillo, Alberto 3 of 3

Abstract

The paper examines candidates' choice between policies that increase the number of supporters and policies that foster their participation. Voter turnout is decided at the group level, in response to candidates' policies. A convex utility function captures the alienation of citizens who are far from all candidates. In equilibrium, extreme policies are adopted as a mobilization strategy, if citizens are sufficiently polarized and inclined to alienation. Otherwise, a standard result of convergence to the center obtains, in line with the persuasion of the swing voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2023/06, Vol. 25, Issue 3, p515
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Social Sciences and Humanities
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:1097-3923
  • DOI:10.1111/jpet.12628
  • Accession Number:163309785
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Journal of Public Economic Theory is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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