Social Conflict and the Evolution of Unequal Conventions.

This article develops an evolutionary game-theoretic model explaining the persistence of unequal social norms and conventions—such as those governing gender, ethnicity, class, and labor relations—that endure despite inefficiency and lack of formal institutional support. Extending standard asymmetric stochastic evolutionary games, the model incorporates intentional idiosyncratic deviations by agents and heterogeneous subpopulation sizes, showing that when subordinate groups are large and deviant behavior is intentional, risk-dominated, unequal conventions can be stochastically stable and persist long-term. The framework is further generalized to bipartite networks representing local interactions, with conditions (termed P-fragility) under which unequal conventions remain stable due to network structure, and is applied empirically to wage-setting conventions in monopsonistic labor markets, illustrating how employer-worker networks can stabilize inefficient, unequal wage norms. Additionally, the model highlights how asymmetric information access between groups can influence equilibrium selection, favoring dominant groups even when population sizes are equal, thereby providing a decentralized mechanism for the emergence and durability of social inequalities without reliance on formal laws or elite coordination.