JOURNAL ARTICLE

Against epistemic accounts of luck.

  • Published In: Analysis, 2023, v. 83, n. 3. P. 474 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Hill, Jesse 3 of 3

Abstract

The article critically examines epistemic accounts of luck, which define luck's chanciness condition based on a subject's epistemic position—either their evidence or knowledge about an event's occurrence. It argues that both evidence-based and knowledge-based epistemic accounts fail due to counterexamples where significant events are either mistakenly classified as lucky or non-lucky despite the subject's epistemic state. Additionally, epistemic accounts struggle to accommodate constitutive luck, such as genetic traits, because these cases lack relevant epistemic conditions prior to the subject's existence. The article concludes that luck's chanciness condition cannot be adequately defined solely in epistemic terms.

Additional Information

  • Source:Analysis. 2023/07, Vol. 83, Issue 3, p474
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Social Sciences and Humanities
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0003-2638
  • DOI:10.1093/analys/anad013
  • Accession Number:173782044
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