Putting the Civilian Back in Civil–Military Relations: How Civilian Leaders Condition the Effects of Security Assistance.

This article examines why United States (US) security assistance efforts to build partner militaries that adhere to liberal civil–military norms succeed in some cases but fail in others, focusing on the moderating role of recipient states' civilian leaders. Drawing on comparative case studies of US army-building in Iraq (2003–2014) and Liberia (2006–2016), the study finds that while US advisors can effectively socialize partner soldiers to internalize norms such as respect for human rights and civilian control, these efforts are often undermined when civilian leaders engage in coup-proofing tactics—strategies to secure their political power by politicizing or fragmenting the military. In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s coup-proofing reversed US socialization gains, transforming the military into a coercive instrument of his regime, whereas in Liberia, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s restraint from coup-proofing allowed US training to foster a professional military that respected liberal norms. The findings suggest that successful promotion of liberal civil–military relations through security assistance requires not only socializing soldiers but also securing cooperation from civilian leadership, highlighting a need to reconsider US approaches that focus predominantly on military actors.