Abdul Ghani Baradar

Summary: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was the number two leader of the Afghan Taliban until his arrest in February 2010 by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), reportedly aided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Whether his arrest was the result of a newfound cooperative attitude in Pakistan’s government or a timely accident was a matter for debate. Some analysts said they thought the loss of Baradar could deal a critical blow to the Afghan Taliban, as it occurred in the midst of a new United States (US) offensive in southern Afghanistan; other analysts were more doubtful, pointing out that many regional Taliban commanders operated largely autonomously. Baradar was a long-time close assistant to the previous Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar and was widely considered to be the Taliban leader most likely to be amenable to peace negotiations with the government of Hamid Karzai. Following his release in 2018 at the request of US officials, Baradar resumed a leadership role in the Taliban, where he was largely responsible for the signing of the Doha Agreement in 2020 and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 following the withdrawal of US troops earlier that year. Baradar is an acting first deputy prime minister in the reinstated Taliban regime in Afghanistan. He also serves as Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and heads the Economic Commission in the government. He is the fourth in command in the Taliban regime.  In keeping with his legacy of diplomacy and cooperation, he has worked for improved Afghan housing, promoted investment in Afghanistan, and taken part in meetings on climate change.

Nationality: Afghan. Member of the Popalzai tribe of Pashtun (same tribe as Afghan President Hamid Karzai).

Position, Title, or Affiliation: Acting first deputy prime minister, military commander of Afghan Taliban; Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs

Activities Prior to Arrest:

• Widely described as second in command of the Afghan Taliban, in charge of military strategy, treasury, and the appointment of “shadow governors” in some Afghan provinces prior to his arrest.
• Believed to have been relatively amenable to a negotiated settlement of war in Afghanistan—more so than former Taliban leader Mullah Omar or other Taliban militant leaders. In 2005, Baradar was reported to have authorized a peace overture to Afghan President Karzai.

• 2006: Issued “code of conduct” (Layeha) for Taliban fighters to improve their image among Afghan people by avoiding suicide attacks or civilian deaths.
• Credited with rebuilding the Taliban as an effective fighting force in the period 2006–2010 and being in charge of day-to-day military matters, including the appointment of key commanders.

Last known status: Retained a leadership position within the Taliban following his release from Pakistani custody in 2018. Following his release from prison, Baradar became a deputy leader for the Taliban and head of operations in Qatar. In 2021, Baradar returned to Afghanistan to become a first deputy prime minister in the reinstated Taliban regime. He is the fourth most powerful Taliban leader in the regime of Hibatullah Akhundzada. Baradar serves as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs.

A New York Times report on February 16, 2010, that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the No. 2 leader of the Afghan Taliban after the mysterious Mullah Omar, had been arrested in a raid jointly conducted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and the American CIA in Karachi, gave rise to hopes that the Taliban had suffered a serious blow and that the joint raid was a sign that Pakistan had shifted its long-held position of protecting Afghan Taliban inside Pakistan while fighting the Pakistani Taliban inside its borders.

Shortly afterward, the New York Times published a follow-up report that suggested Baradar’s capture had been a surprise, welcomed by the Americans but not necessarily the result of a shift in attitudes by Pakistan’s influential military and its ISI agency in particular.

In either case, Baradar was widely credited with rebuilding the Afghan Taliban as an effective fighting force since being placed in charge of the radical Islamist group’s military wing in 2006. Numerous reports described Baradar as second in influence and power only to Mullah Omar, the founder and long-time reclusive leader of the Afghan Taliban. Baradar was described as being in charge of day-to-day operations, the naming of senior military commanders, and managing the group’s finances, including revenue streams from the sale of opium and “contributions” from Arab states.

Baradar was also described in most press reports as being the Taliban leader most amenable to a negotiated peace settlement of the conflict with the government of President Hamid Karzai and Karzai’s NATO allies, including the United States. According to press reports, in 2004, Baradar sent a peace overture to Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The initiative did not succeed, but some analysts still believed Baradar was the Taliban leader most likely to be amenable to future negotiations to end the fighting that began with the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 in response to the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001.

Analysts were divided in their assessment of Baradar’s arrest and what it might mean for the future of the conflict. Initial reports said the Pakistani ISI—a long-time supporter of the Taliban inside Afghanistan—had cooperated with the CIA in arresting Baradar. Later reports said the capture of Baradar in the raid in Karachi came as a surprise—and, therefore, could not be trusted as a signal of changed thinking by Pakistan’s military. Initial analysis suggested that the Pakistan government, sensing a possible future negotiated settlement, wanted to guarantee itself a seat at the table by cooperating in capturing the number two Afghan leader, possibly to counteract the perceived influence of archrival India in Afghanistan.

Analysts also differed over the significance of Baradar’s arrest on the fighting capability of the Afghan Taliban. Some analysts said Baradar was actively in charge not only of assigning regional commanders of the Taliban but also of assigning the so-called shadow governors of provinces largely controlled by the Taliban. Although Mullah Baradar insisted that Mullah Omar remained in charge of the Taliban, the putative leader was seldom seen or heard in public, evidently preferring to let his deputy, Baradar, run operations and serve as the semi-public face of the Taliban. Mullah Omar died three years into Baradar’s imprisonment.

Other analysts insisted that regional commanders of the Taliban operated semi-autonomously and relied on the “Quetta Shura”—the council of senior Taliban leaders long headquartered in the Pakistani city of Quetta, in Balochistan province—for general guidance, suggesting that Baradar’s capture might not have had a significant short-term impact on the course of the war in Afghanistan.

Biography

Like Mullah Omar, Baradar was a veteran of the jihad against occupying Soviet troops in the 1980s. Toward the end of the war, Baradar served under Omar’s command; some reports said the two men married sisters, although other reports deny they are related in that way.

After the Soviet withdrawal, both men worked together to run a madrassa in Omar’s home district of Maiwand. Omar was one of the first to take up arms against local warlords who habitually kidnapped and engaged in child abuse; Baradar was one of his first recruits in what was the origin of the Afghan Taliban. (See separate Background Information Summary in this database.) He is mentioned as one of the four founding members of the Taliban movement.

The movement grew until it eventually controlled most of the country, with Baradar serving as Mullah Omar’s chief assistant, at headquarters, then in western Afghanistan, and in Kabul. Some analysts said Baradar was Omar’s most trusted military commander in the fight against the Northern Alliance in the years when the Taliban was the effective government of Afghanistan. When both men were forced to flee Kabul in the face of the post-9/11 American invasion, Baradar was said to have driven the motorcycle that carried both men out of the capital ahead of the advancing US troops.

Subsequently, Baradar went into exile in Pakistan, spending most of his time in Quetta and occasionally traveling to Karachi, where the Taliban maintained a network of supporters. Most Western analysts believe the Taliban leaders operated under some degree of protection by the Pakistani ISI, who had supported them in the fight against the occupying Russians in the 1980s and subsequently saw the Taliban as allies of Pakistan in Afghanistan.

According to an extensive portrait of Baradar published in Newsweek in July 2009 (issue of August 3, 2009), Baradar operated in the style of a traditional Pashtun tribal chief, listening to complaints or appeals by those reporting to him, settling quarrels between different commanders, and acting to distribute funds.

He is also described as capable of acting decisively to maintain his position within the group; several of his top rivals have been killed by US raids that appeared to have depended on inside intelligence tips. According to the Newsweek portrait published in July 2009: “Of the four other Taliban leaders who had served with Mullah Omar since his 1994 revolt in Maiwand, two were captured by the Pakistanis and two were killed by the Americans. Most notable may have been the US-led commando raid that killed Baradar’s bloodthirsty rival, [former head of operations] Mullah Dadullah Akhund in May 2007 (see separate Background Information Summary on Mullah Dadullah in this database.) Since the 1990s, Baradar had loathed Dadullah’s reckless brutality, while Dadullah despised Baradar’s cautiousness and resented his close relationship with Mullah Omar.”

After Dadullah’s death, Baradar succeeded him as chief military commander of the Taliban, the position he held when he was arrested in 2010. During Baradar’s time in prison, Mullah Omar reportedly passed away due to tuberculosis.

In 2018, Baradar was released from Pakistani custody at the request of US and Afghan diplomats. Intended as a step toward peace with the Taliban, Baradar quickly reassumed a leadership role in the organization, where he served in the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Qatar. Baradar later signed the Doha Agreement, the peace treaty between the Taliban and the United States, in February 2020.

Following the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021 and the subsequent Taliban takeover of the country, Baradar was appointed a first deputy prime minister of the newly installed Taliban government under new leader Hibatullah Akhundzada. Baradar was subsequently included in Time magazine’s list of the 100 Most Influential People of 2021. On August 23, 2021, CIA Director William J. Burns met privately with Baradar in Kabul, where they discussed the August 31 deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. The same year, reports stated that Baradar had not appeared publicly for several days, leading to speculation that he had been injured or killed during internal power struggles within the new Afghan government. The next day, these claims were dismissed when a video interview of Baradar was released in which he rejected the rumors.

Baradar continued his legacy of diplomacy as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. In 2024, he led a thirty-member Taliban economic delegation in Tehran, Iran, to discuss problems with Iranian officials. Among the issues were water rights and the increasing number of Afghan migrants in Iran. The delegates also discussed ways that Afghanistan and Iran could help each other economically. During the second 2024 United States presidential debate, former President Donald Trump referred to his alleged interactions with Baradar and to the latter’s involvement in the negotiations that ended the war. In late 2025, Baradar focused on initiatives to reduce trade dependence on Pakistan owing to the border issues and he was meeting international counterparts from countries such as Russia and Turkmenistan for investing in Afghanistan and energy cooperation initiatives.

Bibliography

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“The Deputy PM for Economic Affairs, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, Met Today—October 15, 2025—in His Office with Representatives of Several Russian Companies.” DPMEA, Oct. 2015, dpmea.gov.af/1404-English-News-113. Accessed 17 Dec. 2025.

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“It Is Scheduled That Today, Monday, October 20, 2025, the Deputy PM for Economic Affairs, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, and the National Leader of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Will Visit the Implementation Site of the TAPI Project in Afgh” DPMEA, Oct. 2015, dpmea.gov.af/1404-English-News-114. Accessed 17 Dec. 2025.

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Rashid, Ahmed. “The 100 Most Influential People of 2021: Abdul Ghani Baradar.” Time, 15 Sept. 2021, time.com/collection/100-most-influential-people-2021/6095986/abdul-ghani-baradar. Accessed 17 Dec. 2025.