Redeeming Social Value
Redeeming Social Value refers to the quality of a work—such as a book or film—that provides societal worth, often used in legal discussions surrounding free speech and obscenity. This concept gained prominence in the U.S. Supreme Court's evaluations of whether certain materials, deemed obscene, should be protected under the First Amendment. Historically, courts have grappled with the balance between censorship and the protection of controversial ideas, where works previously labeled as obscene were presumed to have no redeeming social value. However, landmark decisions, including Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, shifted this perspective, affirming that even unorthodox ideas warrant protection if they possess some societal merit. The Miller v. California case further refined this standard, stipulating that to be considered obscene, a work must lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The evolution of the definition of redeeming social value highlights ongoing debates about freedom of expression and the role of art and literature in society. Understanding this concept is essential for those interested in the intersection of law, culture, and the arts.
Redeeming Social Value
DEFINITION: Positive quality of a book, film, or other work that gives it some measure of worth to society as a whole
SIGNIFICANCE: The U.S. Supreme Court once defined this concept as a measure for determining whether works otherwise deemed obscene are worthy of free speech protections
In the evolving definitions of obscenity that British and American courts have used since the Hicklin case in 1868 to determine whether books and other materials should be protected from censorship, the question of whether otherwise obscene materials have some kind of merit that should exempt them from prosecution has arisen repeatedly. In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Roth v. United States, that most “unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection” of the First Amendment. Until that decision, any material labeled as “obscene” was automatically regarded as something other than constitutionally protected speech. The presumption was that any material deemed to be obscenity lacked “redeeming social value” because of its obscenity.
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts in 1966, the Supreme Court transformed the concept of “lack of redeeming social value” from a description of obscene material to part of the definition of what constituted obscenity. Under this revised definition, any material containing redeeming social value, however slight, could not be labeled obscene. In the opinion that he wrote for this decision, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., advised lower courts facing obscenity decisions to consider “all possible uses” of material before judging it “utterly without redeeming social value,” and thus obscene. In Miller v. California, in 1972, the Court replaced its social value standard with the requirement that, to be judged obscene, a work must lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Bibliography
"Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)." Justia, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/15/#tab-opinion-1950401. Accessed 20 Oct. 2024.
"Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)." Justia, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/383/413. Accessed 20 Oct. 2024.
"Obscenity: Redeeming Social Value." Time, time.com/archive/6874321/obscenity-redeeming-social-value. Accessed 20 Oct. 2024.
Pacelle Jr., Richard L. "Roth v. United States (1957)." Free Speech Center, 9 July 2024, firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/roth-v-united-states. Accessed 20 Oct. 2024.