Iraq after US Withdrawal

In December 2011, following executive orders by US President Barack Obama, the United States withdrew its remaining combat forces from Iraq. In the subsequent years, tensions between Shia and Sunni Muslims increased. Despite rising oil production, the recovery of the Iraqi economy lagged in 2012 and 2013. Housing, clean water, and electricity remained in short supply due to construction backlogs and endemic corruption. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki evaded his promise to form an inclusive government, instead filling top positions with loyalists. The only remaining top-level Sunni in the cabinet—Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi—was targeted and his bodyguards arrested in 2012, sparking protests. Sunni’s anger at Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki peaked in June 2014. In this state of turbulence, a new insurgency, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—formerly known as Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia—emerged to rapidly overrun large swaths of Syria and northern and central Iraq. ISIS overran Mosul—Iraq’s second-largest city. Kurdish groups took control of Kirkuk, previewing a possible segmented future for Iraq. Violence increased as ISIS advanced, taking control of cities in the Anbar province. From its stronghold in eastern Syria, ISIS led a 2014 mixed-force attack on Mosul, routing the army. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called on Shias to unite, and Shia militias reemerged. President Barack Obama announced the United States would send advisers to assist Iraqi armed forces. Coalition, Kurdish, and Iraqi efforts led to the recapture of territorial areas controlled by ISIS. In 2017, the last remaining ISIS strongholds in Iraq and Syria were recaptured, thus signaling an end to the Islamic State and its self-proclaimed caliphate. 

Key Figures

• Haider al-Abadi—Iraq's prime minister 2014-2018.
• Nuri al-Maliki—Defied calls for a more inclusive government, and was determined to hold on as prime minister. He ultimately stepped down in August 2014.
• Moqtada al-Sadr—leader of the single largest Shiite faction, often maneuvered against Maliki.
• Masoud Barzani—President of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (2005-2017), wrangled with Baghdad over territory and oil rights.
• Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—Head of ISIS until his death in 2019, announced in June 2014 that territories held by ISIS in Iraq and Syria were now united as a caliphate called the Islamic State.
• Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, urged the new parliament in June 2014 to form a government with broad support that would avoid past mistakes—interpreted by many as a rebuke to Maliki. In 2023, he ranked among the top leaders in The Muslim 500: The World's Most Influential Muslims.
• Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi—A member of two top councils in Iran, was Tehran's candidate to succeed the eighty-four-year-old Sistani as grand ayatollah. Died in 2018.

Key Events

• March 2010: After close elections, Maliki agreed to power-sharing but later blocked the appointment of key ministers.
• December 2011: Maliki arrested two top Sunni officials as the last American troops left Iraq.
• December 2012: Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi's bodyguards were arrested, provoking protests in Sunni provinces.
• July 2013: The scale of violence peaked with coordinated suicide attacks on the Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons. The year's death toll passed 4,000.
• April 2014: In parliamentary elections, Maliki's coalition won 28 percent of the seats, by far the largest bloc.
• June 2014: ISIS overran Mosul, scattering Iraqi troops. Kurdish militia took control of oil-rich Kirkuk. ISIS controlled 70 percent of Al Anbar province.
• August 2014: President Obama ordered limited US airstrikes against militants in Iraq and had food and water delivered to trapped Iraqis.
• April 2015: US troops returned to Iraq but only in a training capacity to help Iraq's troops prepare to fight against ISIS.
• June 2015: ISIS began to refer to itself as the Islamic State (IS)
• June 2015: President Obama authorized 450 additional US troops to be sent to Iraq for training purposes to take place at a base in Anbar province.
• June 2016: The Iraqi military began a successful military offensive against IS in Fallujah.
• July 2017: Iraqi military retook Mosul
• November 2017: IS is defeated from its last areas of control in Iraq and Syria, including Mosul and Raqqa
• October 2018: IS is declared defeated

Status

In July 2014, the Iraqi Army could not mount a counter-offensive to retake Mosul. The army doubled its forces in Baghdad as ISIS advanced toward the capital. The Iraqi parliament struggled to find consensus on a new government. Maliki sought a third term as prime minister. Some observers thought that the fall of Mosul strengthened Maliki's position by encouraging Shiites to unify under his leadership. However, by August 2014, Maliki agreed to step down and was replaced by Haider al-Abadi, who immediately promised to restructure the cabinet and the country's political landscape. That same month, President Obama began authorizing aid to Iraq's efforts to counter ISIS's advancement through limited airstrikes aimed at militants in Iraq. As Iraqi forces struggled, Obama sent US troops back into Iraq for the first time since the 2011 withdrawal in April 2015. This initiative focused on further training for the Iraqi forces to effectively fight ISIS, leading to more US troops being sent to the country to administer training by June 2015. The following decade saw continued US military presence in the region.

In the Kurdish autonomous region, President Barzani said his region supported full independence from Iraq.

In-Depth Description

During the first year after the withdrawal of American troops, Iraq's oil production exceeded 3 million barrels per day, compared with 2 million in 2002. Production was on track to reach six million by 2020. Beyond the oil sector, progress was inconsistent. Most Iraqis continued to receive sporadic service from water and power utilities, and the housing shortage remained acute. The National Development Plan (2010-2014)—which called for projects to create 3.4 million non-oil jobs—became mired in a backlog of unfinished work. Corruption had a paralyzing effect on development. On a 100-point anti-corruption scale developed by the International Monetary Fund—where a score of zero indicates a country is highly corrupt—Iraq was rated a five.

Maliki Consolidates Power

The 2010 parliamentary election shaped the political situation in Iraq in 2012-2013. Nuri al-Maliki, seeking a second term as prime minister, led the State of Law coalition, appealing to Iraq's Shia majority. However, the Shia vote was split when Moqtada al-Sadr, whose following was primarily poor, working-class Iraqis, ran a separate slate of candidates under the banner of the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). Consequently, a third party, Iraqiya—a coalition of Sunni and secular Shia leaders—won two more seats than Maliki's State of Law coalition. To remain as prime minister, Maliki accepted the Erbil Agreement, mediated by President Jalal Talabani.

Under the agreement, the ministers of defense and the interior had to be from parties other than that of Maliki. He bypassed the requirement by objecting to every candidate and filling the posts with acting ministers—who did not have to be confirmed by Iraq's parliament—the Council of Representatives (COR). According to analysts, the COR had the power to remove Maliki from office by a vote of no confidence, but did not take this action because of a sense of futility. No one wanted a return to the governmental paralysis that lasted eight months after the 2010 election.

As American troops withdrew in December 2011, Maliki had two of Iraqiya's top Sunni leaders placed under house arrest—Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi and Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi—while their bodyguards were interrogated and tortured. Hashemi fled the country. Charges against Issawi were dropped.

Tension between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan

In 2012, tensions ratcheted up significantly between the national government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The northern part of Iraq functioned as an autonomous region since the 1990s when the West imposed a no-fly zone during the regime of Saddam Hussein. Since then, the North has benefited from greater security, social unity, and economic development compared to the rest of Iraq. Issues between the KRG and Baghdad involve territorial claims and management of oil resources. The KRG wanted control of oil produced in its territory, while Baghdad fears Iraqi Kurdistan is edging toward complete independence. Under the current arrangement, Baghdad managed oil revenue, and local authorities managed production. The two sides pressured each other, with Baghdad occasionally withholding payments and the KRG retaliating with production cuts.

In August 2012, Baghdad organized a new unit of security forces—the Tigris Operational Command—which massed troops near Kirkuk and which Kurds felt should be part of their region. The KRG sent its forces to the area, and by November, there had been several clashes with shots fired. Maliki and KRG President Masoud Barzani exchanged threats of further action but agreed to a pullback at the urging of President Jalal Talabani.

The potential for new disputes over sovereignty arose in July 2013, when Barzani threatened to send KRG troops into Syria—across a national border—to protect Kurdish refugees. The prospect of KRG forces holding territory in northern Syria would have raised alarm throughout the Mideast about Kurdish nationalist ambitions.

Return of Sunni Insurgency

President Talabani—a stabilizing force in Iraqi politics—suffered a stroke on December 18, 2012. The next day, security forces again moved against Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, arresting his bodyguards. Protests broke out in Baghdad and the Sunni provinces of Anbar, Salahuddin, and Nineveh, and continued into the new year. In February, 100,000 protesters blocked roads to Fallujah and Ramadi. By May 2013, the protests became anti-government attacks which spread to Shia areas, with insurgent bombings averaging one per day.

The bulk of the bomb attacks—at security checkpoints, public gatherings, and Shia mosques—were the work of ISIS. Driven out of Iraq by the Sunni Awakening in 2007, the group made a robust comeback behind Sunni discontent in 2013. In July, ISIS staged simultaneous attacks on Abu Ghraib and the Taji prisons near Baghdad—using a dozen suicide bombers to free 500 prisoners. During the second half of 2013, casualties from terror attacks rose to a level not seen since 2008—more than 7,000 by the end of the year.

In December 2013 and January 2014, ISIS fighters joined tribal militias and drove government forces out of Ramadi and Fallujah, the two largest cities in Anbar province. The Iraqi Army soon took back Ramadi, but ISIS was entrenched in parts of Fallujah and towns throughout Anbar province.

ISIS Takes Mosul. Previously thought to have 2,000 to 4,000 fighters in Iraq, ISIS descended on Mosul with a force two to three times that size—augmented by ISIS units in Syria. The June 10, 2014, attack overwhelmed security forces around the city as soldiers fled or surrendered en masse. ISIS forces continued their advance, taking Tikrit to the south on June 11, Tal Afar to the west on June 16, and parts of Baquba on June 17—just thirty-eight miles northeast of Baghdad. With Mosul secured, the insurgents captured the oil refinery at nearby Baiji. ISIS also controlled and drew revenue from oil production facilities in eastern Syria. The group issued a new charter for the government of Mosul, suggesting that ISIS intended to make the city its stronghold in Iraq, a counterpart to Raqqa in Syria.

While ISIS was taking Mosul in the north, Sunni militants in Anbar province advanced along the Euphrates River—taking Haditha, Hit, and other cities. In the Anbar offensive, ISIS had support from other Sunni insurgent groups, including former military personnel from the regime of Saddam Hussein. Secular nationalist militias under the General Military Council for Iraq's Revolutionaries (GMC) were active in Fallujah and Ramadi. The Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI)—which demobilized after the departure of American forces in 2011 but took up arms again in 2014—may have contributed fighters in Salahuddin and Diyala provinces, north and east of Baghdad.

As Mosul fell and government forces fled, Kurdish troops took over the northern city of Kirkuk and its nearby oilfields. The KRG was unwilling to surrender Kirkuk even if the government in Baghdad retook Mosul. Kurds regarded Kirkuk as a Kurdish city, and its oil resources allowed KRG production of one million barrels per day, considered a threshold for the economic viability of an independent Kurdistan.

Aftermath in Baghdad and Washington. Through July 2014, the Iraqi Army could not organize a counterattack. Approximately sixty of its 243 battalions were not available for duty. The army concentrated available forces around Baghdad while the air force carried out jet strikes to disrupt militants advancing to surround the capital. In Baghdad, Shia militias came forward in answer to a call by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to defend the nation against insurgents.

On June 20, 2014, Sistani urged the Council of Representatives (COR)—stymied by factionalism since the April 30 elections—to form a government with broad support. Prime Minister Maliki rejected suggestions by the United States and others that he step aside in favor of a unity government that included Sunni and Kurdish cabinet ministers. Maliki asserted a broad coalition would thwart the people's will, who had made the State of Law the largest voting bloc in the COR. Maliki asked the COR for emergency powers, but there was no immediate action on the measure. In early July, the COR elected a new president of Iraq and a new house speaker, filling these positions with a Kurd, Fouad Massoum, and a Sunni, Salim al-Jabouri. According to the pattern followed since 2003, the prime minister would be a Shia. Maliki announced in July that he would run for a third term as prime minister, but by August 2014, Maliki had stepped down and was replaced by Haider al-Abadi.

Return of the United States

Responding to the collapse of Iraqi defense forces in June 2014, President Obama announced the US would send 300 military advisers to Iraq. Their role would be to support US policy objectives. These were to prevent the establishment of Iraq as a haven for terrorists and to identify needs and solutions for Iraq's armed forces. Obama added that the US stood ready to take precisely-targeted action as required by emerging circumstances. US troops would not be sent to Iraq as combat forces. The White House also said the US would communicate with Iran but would not participate in joint operations with Iran against insurgents.

Beginning in August 2014, the US renewed airstrikes against ISIS. American aircraft also struck targets in Syria. Coalition airpower, coupled with Iraqi ground forces, enabled the recapture of areas seized by ISIS. In 2015, ISIS began to refer to itself as the Islamic State (IS). In 2016, Iraqi forces advanced on Fallujah while Kurdish forces moved into Syria. The IS was capable of terror attacks on unprotected civilian targets in Iraq but was unable to stem the tide of Iraqi and Kurdish forces. By January 2017, Iraqi forces had retaken 70 percent of Mosul from IS. The US military presence in Iraq was combined with similar efforts by US forces in Syria. In December 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory for Iraq over IS.

2020s Security Environment

In the mid-2020s, Iraq continued to face major challenges to its national stability. Only a small group of approximately 2,500 American military advisors remained as the country’s security environment remained very contentious. The decades-long conflict displaced more than three million people. Reconciliation between Sunni and Shia communities remained poor, even as more Sunni participation in the Iraqi government re-emerged. Individual incidents of sectarian violence continued, however, not on the scale of decades past. Spillover from the Israel-Hamas conflict reached Iraq as Iranian militias targeted US personnel.

In October 2023, an American contractor was killed at the Al-Asad airbase; the same month, Abdul Latif Rashid, a Kurd, became Iraq's ninth President. Between October 2023 and February 2024, US troops in Iraq were attacked approximately sixty times. This prompted US airstrikes against Iran-backed terror groups in February 2024. In September 2024, officials reached a security agreement that included plans to withdraw most US troops from Iraq by September 2025, and to have all US personnel leave Iraq by September 2026, except for a small unit of about 300 individuals supporting intelligence and surveillance operations.

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