Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW)

"Fourth-Generation Warfare" is a term coined in 1989 by American military analysts to describe the style of combat that began to emerge in the late twentieth century. Analysts examined factors such as the loss of the nation-states' monopoly on combat forces and the rapid globalization of military technology. By 2006, the consensus of many experts, coupled with experience, led to an agreement that the following elements defined 4GW:

• One side of the conflict is an ideological organization, or "network" of like-minded individuals, rather than a nation-state. The network's objective is not a direct attack on its adversary's armed forces but rather to undermine an adversary's strengths and exploit its weaknesses in various ways.
• The network employs asymmetric warfare tactics against an adversary's conventional armaments (e.g., improvised explosive devices [IEDs] against a convoy of armed troops).
• The network does not aim to defeat a nation's military but rather to undermine its society. A 4GW operation hopes to chip away at its target until the adversary loses its will to fight. A 4GW will be most successful when the non-state entity does not attempt, at least in the short term, to impose its own rule but tries to disorganize and delegitimize its adversary to the point of collapse. The aim is to force the state adversary to expend personnel and resources in a (futile) attempt to establish order, ideally in such a highhanded way that it merely increases disorder until the state surrenders or withdraws. The aim is to chip away at the state enemy until the adversary loses its will to fight.

Four Generations

For military analysts involved in 4GW theory, the clock started ticking in the mid-seventeenth century with the rise of firearms. The generations of warfare are then designated:

First generation: Napoleonic Era, with firearms and conscripted armies.

Second generation: US Civil War; WW I-nations devote vast resources to warfare.

Third generation: WW II-armored, mechanical warfare; high maneuverability.

Fourth generation: Warriors whose allegiance is to a philosophy rather than to a nation blurred distinctions between war and peace, battlefield and safe haven.

The term "fourth-generation warfare" first appeared in an article by William S. Lind and Colonel Keith Nightengale for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989. After observing that "the peacetime soldier's principal task is to prepare effectively for the next war," the authors described different categories of modern warfare. They chose the word "generation" to signify the evolutionary aspects of warfare. Each major conflict uses the tools and tactics of the previous conflict but also introduces innovations, whether technologically driven or in the form of new deployments of established tactics. The authors present the following view of the new warfare:


"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to
be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction
between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point.
It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no
definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between
"civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur
concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including
their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.
Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed
communications sites, and large headquarters will become
rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true
of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power
plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as
manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on
effectiveness in joint operations as lines between
responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all
these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth
generation will merely accentuate them…

"For about the last 500 years, the West has defined warfare.
For a military to be effective it generally had to follow Western
models. Because the West's strength is technology, it may tend to
conceive of a fourth generation in technological terms.

"However, the West no longer dominates the world. A fourth
generation may emerge from non-Western cultural traditions, such
as Islamic or Asiatic traditions. The fact that some non-Western
areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology
may lead them to develop a fourth generation through ideas rather
than technology.

"The genesis of an idea-based fourth generation may be visible
in terrorism. This is not to say that terrorism is fourth
generation warfare, but rather that elements of it may be signs
pointing toward a fourth generation.

"Some elements in terrorism appear to reflect the previously
noted 'carryovers' from third generation warfare. The more
successful terrorists appear to operate on broad mission orders
that carry down to the level of the individual terrorist. The
'battlefield" is highly dispersed and includes the whole of
the enemy's society. The terrorist lives almost completely off
the land and the enemy. Terrorism is very much a matter of
maneuver: the terrorist's firepower is small, and where and
when he applies it is critical."

Another definition of fourth-generation warfare was offered by analyst Thomas X. Hammes in Contemporary Security Policy in August 2005:


"4GW uses all available networks - political, economic, social
and military-to convince the enemy's political decision-makers
that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly
for the perceived benefit. It is rooted in the fundamental
precept that superior political will, when properly employed,
can defeat greater economic and military power. 4GW does not
attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces.
Instead, combining guerrilla tactics or civil disobedience
with the soft networks of social, cultural and economic ties,
disinformation campaigns and innovative political activity, it
directly attacks the enemy's political will.

"4GW spans the spectrum of human activity - political, economic,
social and military. Politically, it involves transnational,
national and sub-national organizations and networks to convey
its message to the target audiences. Strategically, it focuses
on breaking the will of decision-makers. It uses different
pathways to deliver different messages for different target
audiences. The messages serve three purposes: to break the
enemy's will; maintain the will of its own people; and ensure
neutrals remain neutral or provide tacit support to the cause.
Operationally, it delivers those messages in a variety of ways
from high-impact, high-profile direct military actions to
indirect economic attacks such as those designed to drive up
the price of oil. Tactically, 4GW forces avoid direct
confrontation if possible; while seeking maximum impact they
use materials present in the society under attack. To minimize
their logistics requirements they can attack using industrial
chemicals, liquefied natural-gas tankers or fertilizer
shipments. Finally, 4GW practitioners plan for long wars -
decades rather than months or years.

"In sum, 4GW is political, socially (rather than technically)
networked and protracted in duration. It is the antithesis of
the high-technology, short war the Pentagon is preparing to
fight."

Al Qaeda as a 4GW player

Al Qaeda did not exist outside the Afghanistan conflict in 1989 when the paper by Lind and Nightengale was published, but al Qaeda employed the methods that fall into the 4GW framework. Al Qaeda is transnational, with adherents and sympathizers in many countries, including Western countries. Its philosophy is both simple and sweeping: a global crusade against "the infidels" and crushing the "great Satan." To do this, al Qaeda bypassed the US military. It aimed at symbols of US power (the Pentagon, the World Trade Center). Suddenly, the battlefield was not in some remote country on another continent; 4GW brought it to urban office towers, civilian aircraft, and even our shoes and the size of the toiletries we are allowed to carry on planes.

The warfare was brought to our minds since Americans may have felt they could no longer sleep safely under the assurance that American soldiers "on the front" (e.g., Iraq) were on the job keeping civilians back home secure. In the 4GW world, everywhere and everything is the front.

Al Qaeda also provides a good illustration of incorporating new technology into the 4GW arsenal. The rise of the Internet enabled a loose network of Islamic militants to simultaneously be a cohesive and highly dispersed force. It allowed for highly coordinated actions when necessary. Al Qaeda became an expert at propaganda and psychological warfare through media manipulation. It regularly produced material that was disseminated over the Al Jazeera network, material that taunted the West but also allowed the global Islamic population to experience the taunting, thereby annoying the West while enhancing al Qaeda's reputation in its community.

The psychological intimidation of showing beheadings of Westerners on videotape and the Internet is enormous.

Examples of 4GW conflict include the war in Kosovo, the Lebanese civil war (1976-90), the second Chechen war, the war in Iraq (2003-2011), and the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka is another group that uses 4GW tactics.

Counter-Action

Military analysts agree on some actions that can be taken to counter 4GW offensives, although this is still a matter of debate. Analysts agree on the need to isolate and secure the homeland since a few individuals can inflict widespread damage (e.g., disrupting computer networks that control the national infrastructure-communications, banking, etc.). How to neutralize the effects of "home-grown" terrorists, such as the British citizens arrested in the transatlantic bomb incident of August 2006, is a stubborn problem.

Analysts suggest that 4GW has even changed the requirements for coping as an effective national leader. In addition to the usual qualities sought in those who fill high-level government positions, a successful leader in the 4GW era must understand the role of technology in warfare, which has become a major potential battleground.

Fifth-Generation or Cyber Warfare?

As the twenty-first century progressed, the idea of fifth-generation warfare emerged. In this version, war tactics have evolved to include methods of social engineering, attacks on cybersecurity, and the spread of misinformation. Many events that occurred during the 2016 US presidential election show shades of fifth-generation warfare with the hacking of emails and the spreading of misinformation through the Internet and social media sites. Fifth-generation war was unique since many groups within the US used tactics to enhance their political agenda.

A different term that describes the use of this type of electronic operation for military and political effect may be "cyberwarfare." The first instance of cyberwarfare may have, in fact, preceded the 2016 presidential elections. In 2010, a cyber operation was allegedly conducted by US and Israeli operatives. This cooperative effort reportedly injected malware called Stuxnet into software that controlled centrifuges used in Iranian nuclear reactors. The reactors were used at an Iranian research facility alleged to be manufacturing weapons-grade fissionable material for atomic weaponry. The worm allegedly caused the Iranian centrifuges to spin at excessive and destructive speeds while simultaneously masking control software from detecting the malfunction. This cyber attack was reported to have delayed the Iranian nuclear development efforts for two years.

In the mid-2020s, the world was dealing with the complex, long-term, and transnational conflicts created by the rise of insurgency and terrorism that plagued the globe throughout the early twenty-first century. These elements are all characteristic of fourth-generation warfare.

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