RESEARCH STARTER

Military and the Supreme Court

The relationship between the military and the Supreme Court in the United States is characterized by a distinct separation of legal spheres, with the military primarily governed by Congress and the president rather than the courts. This delineation has roots in historical cases such as Dynes v. Hoover and Burns v. Wilson, which established that the military justice system operates independently from the federal judicial system. The Supreme Court tends to defer to legislative and executive discretion regarding military structure and operations, as seen in cases like Orloff v. Willoughby and Weiss v. United States. Moreover, members of the armed services experience a different application of the Bill of Rights, resulting in limitations on rights such as free speech and political participation.

While the Court generally maintains a deferential stance, notable exceptions exist, particularly in cases concerning equal protection, such as Frontiero v. Richardson, which challenged discriminatory practices within military benefits. The Court also acknowledges the unique challenges and circumstances of wartime, allowing for specific military regulations that may not align with civilian standards. Historical conflicts, particularly during the Civil War, have highlighted the tension between military jurisdiction and the judiciary, where key cases like Ex parte Milligan established important precedents regarding the rights of civilians versus military authority. Overall, the interaction between the military and the Supreme Court reflects a complex balance of power, shaped by both legal principles and historical context.

Full Article

DESCRIPTION: The United States Armed Forces, which has its own courts that enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

SIGNIFICANCE: The US Supreme Court has limited power of review over the military, which is guided primarily by Congress and the executive branch.

When the Supreme Court defined the relationship between the military and the Court in the mid-nineteenth century, it recognized the military as a legally separate sphere that looks primarily to Congress and the president for protection and governance rather than to the courts and the Constitution. In Dynes v. Hoover (1858), the Court recognized that the power to provide for a system of military justice arose from Article I, clause 14 of the US Constitution, which permits Congress to make rules to govern and regulate the armed forces and not Article III, and gives Congress the authority to create a system of federal courts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is a specialized court that has appellate jurisdiction over military personnel and others subject to the UCMJ, regardless of where they are stationed worldwide. It is composed of five civilian judges who are appointed by the President, with Senate approval, for fifteen-year terms. This court handles a wide array of legal issues, such as constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedure, evidence, ethics, administrative law, and national security law, all within the context of military service. Its decisions can be reviewed by the Supreme Court through discretionary certiorari.

In Burns v. Wilson (1953), the Court determined that the military justice system exists separate and apart from the federal judicial system. In Parker v. Levy (1974), the Court characterized the military as “a specialized society separate from civilian society.” The historical and contemporary relationships of the Supreme Court to the military are, therefore, highly deferential. Under this approach, the Court grants both Congress and the president considerable discretion in structuring and managing the military. In Orloff v. Willoughby (1953), the Court held that judges are not equipped to oversee military operations. As a result, it applies only a limited scope of judicial review to military matters.

The Court tends to defer to the determination of Congress. In Weiss v. United States (1994), the Court considered whether a special, additional appointment was required under the Constitution for military legal officers—judge advocate generals, or JAGs—to serve as military judges. The Court held that Congress could determine the structure of the military justice system within its discretion and determine judicial appointments as it saw fit.

The Court has generally applied a deferential standard of review in military matters, with few notable exceptions. One such exception is Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), an equal protection challenge to a law that automatically granted housing and medical benefits to the spouses of male service members, but required the spouses of female service members to prove they were dependent for more than half of their support. The Court held that this unequal treatment based on gender violated the Equal Protection Clause. A plurality of the Court applied strict scrutiny, which would require that the classification be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. Four other justices reached the same conclusion, applying a less searching middle-tier scrutiny under which the classification must be closely related to the fulfillment of an important governmental interest. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, contending that the Court should defer to Congress’s policy choices in the area of military rules and regulations. Frontiero clearly departs from the judicial deference evident in Weiss.

The Bill of Rights

Although the extent to which the Bill of Rights applies to members of the armed forces remains controversial, several of its protections are either explicitly or implicitly inapplicable. Additionally, a number of rights that Americans take for granted are either denied to members of the armed services or offered only in a limited way. In United States ex rel. French v. Weeks (1922), the Court found that a member of the armed services is “subject to military law, and the principles of that law, as provided by Congress, [constitute] for him due process of law in a constitutional sense.”

Aside from due process rights, members of the armed services have fewer rights with respect to free speech and political participation. For example, Article 88 of the UCMJ proscribes the use of “contemptuous words” against the president and other high political officials, and Articles 133 (proscribing conduct unbecoming) and 134 (the general article, proscribing service-discrediting conduct) may be used to prosecute disloyal statements. Rights to demonstrate and affiliate with advocacy groups, especially extremist groups or hate groups, which would be protected for civilians, are restricted for military service members. Similar First Amendment restrictions that would be unthinkable in a civilian context have been held constitutional. For example, the Military Honor and Decency Act, which prohibits the sale or rental of sexually explicit materials at military exchanges, was held constitutional in a lower court in General Media Communications v. Cohen in 1997.

The Court also found that religious practices or beliefs cannot excuse compliance with military regulations, such as those governing uniform standards. For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), the Court upheld a ban on wearing headgear indoors as applied to a Jewish officer who wanted to wear a yarmulke. However, in 2017, the Army issued Directive 2017-03, revising its grooming and uniform policy (AR 670-1) to allow greater religious and cultural expression among service members. Under the directive, female soldiers are now permitted to wear locks, provided they are neat and professional.  Soldiers may seek permanent religious accommodations to wear beards, yarmulkes, turbans, under-turbans, and other religious head coverings, while female soldiers may wear hijabs. Religious headgear must be modest in size, color, and design, not interfering with military headgear or equipment. Additionally, head coverings should not obstruct vision, interfere with equipment, or compromise military readiness or unit cohesion. These accommodations no longer require approval only at the brigade-level command; many uniform and grooming accommodation requests are handled at the general court-martial convening authority level.

Equal Protection

Even though racial classifications are subject to the “most rigid scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that wartime necessities allow a military commander to issue a racially based curfew in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943). Similarly, in Korematsu v. United States (1944), the Court upheld the forced relocation and incarceration of more than 100,000 Japanese Americans as constitutional, prioritizing claimed national security over civil rights. This line of reasoning has been widely discredited, and in 2018, the Supreme Court stated that Korematsu was “gravely wrong” and has no place in constitutional law. In addition to restrictions based on race, the Court allowed sex-based discrimination by upholding male-only draft registration in Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) and a naval officer promotion program that provided advantages to women over men in Schlesinger v. Ballard (1975). Likewise, privacy rights in the military enjoy a more limited scope than under the Court’s civilian precedents. For example, a court of military appeals in 1990 upheld the issuance of “safe sex” orders to military personnel infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).

Some provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the Fifth Amendment, expressly exempt members of the military from components of the amendment’s scope. Military service members are not exempt from all aspects of the Fifth Amendment, but the application of its rights is adjusted to fit the distinct mission and structure of the armed forces. Courts have consistently ruled that some constitutional protections may be applied differently in military settings, especially when military necessity and discipline are at stake. The Fifth Amendment excepts from its coverage “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.” The Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury has been treated similarly by implication in Ex parte Milligan (1866). While the essence of these rights remains intact, aspects such as jury selection and trial procedures are tailored to meet the unique disciplinary and operational needs of the armed forces. Courts have generally upheld these modifications as constitutionally valid due to the distinct nature of military service.

In Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. (1948), the Court held that Congress’s war power could extend beyond the cessation of hostilities to address the war’s immediate consequences. Case law, as well as the text of the Constitution, confirms Justice Harold H. Burton’s observation that “we have a fighting constitution” in the opinion for Lichter v. United States (1948). The war powers of the national government embrace not only the power to fight but also “the power to wage war successfully,” according to Charles Evans Hughes in Hirabayashi. Consequently, in the Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), the Court upheld conscription, involuntary military service, and the use of state militias to fight against foreign enemies abroad and rejected the notion that military service is “involuntary servitude” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.

The Civil War

A major period of conflict between the Court and the military occurred during and immediately after the Civil War. Several cases taxed the independence and agility of the judiciary by implicitly or explicitly questioning the constitutionality of congressional Reconstruction and pitting the Court against the Radical Republican Congress. The stage was set by the Court’s ruling in Ex parte Milligan that civilians could not be tried by military courts or commissions in peacetime when civilian courts were open and functioning. The much later case of Ex parte Quirin (1942) involved eight German saboteurs, including Herbert Hans Haupt, who were captured in the US during World War II. This case differed from previous examples as the Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try the men, ruling that because they had entered the US secretly to commit sabotage, they were unlawful enemy combatants. The Court found that even US citizens, like Haupt, could be subject to military trial if they engaged in acts of war against the United States in violation of the laws of war.

Like Milligan’s case, the cases of Ex parte McCardle (1868) and Ex parte Yerger (1869) both involved trials before military commissions. Their trials had occurred long after the cessation of hostilities and during the period of congressional Reconstruction. McCardle was a Mississippi newspaper editor who vituperatively attacked Reconstruction, and Yerger was an accused murderer. Both sought review in the Court by writ of habeas corpus. Resolution of the merits of their attacks on the validity of military jurisdiction and Reconstruction was avoided by a ruling in McCardle’s case that the particular habeas statute on which his petition was grounded had been repealed by Congress before a decision in his case, thus revoking the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over his case and by Yerger’s release from custody to stand trial before a civilian court.

Two other attempts to bring the matter of congressional Reconstruction before the Court directly also failed on justiciability grounds. The resolution of these cases prevented a major contest between the Court and the military. Two other cases, Mississippi v. Johnson (1867), in which the Court held that it lacked the power to enjoin a president, and Georgia v. Stanton (1868), which held that a suit by a state raised a political question, concluded the post-Civil War power struggle. In the end, the Court never ruled on the validity of military rule during Reconstruction. New cases before the Supreme Court continue to raise questions about the limits of military authority over civilians and the scope of habeas corpus, showing that these issues remain unresolved.

In the early 2000s, the Supreme Court issued a series of landmark decisions that clarified the legal rights of individuals detained as enemy combatants in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In Rasul v. Bush (2004), the Court held that foreign detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the right to seek habeas corpus relief in US courts under the federal habeas statute. That same year, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Court ruled that US citizens designated as enemy combatants are entitled to due process protections, including the right to challenge their detention before a neutral decision-maker. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the Court found that the military commissions established to try detainees lacked adequate procedural safeguards and violated both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. Collectively, these cases reinforced the principle that even in matters of national security, the rule of law and constitutional guarantees must be upheld. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of habeas corpus in national security cases, holding that challenges to detention under wartime authority must be brought through proper habeas petitions, without fully resolving the scope of executive power.


Bibliography

Bishop, Joseph W., Jr., Justice Under Fire: A Study of Military Law. Charterhouse, 1974.

Borch, Frederick L. Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti. Office of the Judge Advocate General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 2001.

Fairman, Charles. Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888. Cambridge UP, 2010.

“Federal Court in New York Blocks Removals Under Alien Enemies Act.” ACLU, 6 May 2025, www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-in-new-york-blocks-removals-under-alien-enemies-act. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

Henning, Anna C. “Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Over Military Court Cases.” Congress Research Service, 5 Mar. 2009, sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL34697.pdf. Accessed 14 Apr. 2025.

Hinnershitz, Stephanie. “Korematsu v. United States: 80 Years Later.” The National WWII Museum, 7 Nov. 2024, www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/korematsu-v-united-states. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

Lurie, Jonathan. Arming Military Justice: Origins of the United States Court of Military Appeals, 1775-1950. Princeton UP, 1992.

Lurie, Jonathan. Pursuing Military Justice: The History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 1951-1980. Princeton UP, 1998.

Sanchez, Gabriella. “Landmark Supreme Court Cases.” Brennan Center for Justice, 7 Oct. 2024, www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/landmark-supreme-court-cases. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

Shanor, Charles A., and L. Lynn Hogue. Military Law in a Nutshell. 4th ed., West Publishing, 2013.

“United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.” United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, www.armfor.uscourts.gov/. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

United States Department of Defense. DOD Instruction 1300.17: Religious Liberty in the Military Service. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 1 Sept. 2020, www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130017p.pdf. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

United States Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, docket no. 24-83, 26 July 2024, supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-83/320878/20240726151524849_20240726-151250-95763056-00002416.pdf. PDF file. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

“US ex rel Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922).” FindLaw, caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/259/336.html. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

Full Article

DESCRIPTION: The United States Armed Forces, which has its own courts that enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

SIGNIFICANCE: The US Supreme Court has limited power of review over the military, which is guided primarily by Congress and the executive branch.

When the Supreme Court defined the relationship between the military and the Court in the mid-nineteenth century, it recognized the military as a legally separate sphere that looks primarily to Congress and the president for protection and governance rather than to the courts and the Constitution. In Dynes v. Hoover (1858), the Court recognized that the power to provide for a system of military justice arose from Article I, clause 14 of the US Constitution, which permits Congress to make rules to govern and regulate the armed forces and not Article III, and gives Congress the authority to create a system of federal courts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is a specialized court that has appellate jurisdiction over military personnel and others subject to the UCMJ, regardless of where they are stationed worldwide. It is composed of five civilian judges who are appointed by the President, with Senate approval, for fifteen-year terms. This court handles a wide array of legal issues, such as constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedure, evidence, ethics, administrative law, and national security law, all within the context of military service. Its decisions can be reviewed by the Supreme Court through discretionary certiorari.

In Burns v. Wilson (1953), the Court determined that the military justice system exists separate and apart from the federal judicial system. In Parker v. Levy (1974), the Court characterized the military as “a specialized society separate from civilian society.” The historical and contemporary relationships of the Supreme Court to the military are, therefore, highly deferential. Under this approach, the Court grants both Congress and the president considerable discretion in structuring and managing the military. In Orloff v. Willoughby (1953), the Court held that judges are not equipped to oversee military operations. As a result, it applies only a limited scope of judicial review to military matters.

The Court tends to defer to the determination of Congress. In Weiss v. United States (1994), the Court considered whether a special, additional appointment was required under the Constitution for military legal officers—judge advocate generals, or JAGs—to serve as military judges. The Court held that Congress could determine the structure of the military justice system within its discretion and determine judicial appointments as it saw fit.

The Court has generally applied a deferential standard of review in military matters, with few notable exceptions. One such exception is Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), an equal protection challenge to a law that automatically granted housing and medical benefits to the spouses of male service members, but required the spouses of female service members to prove they were dependent for more than half of their support. The Court held that this unequal treatment based on gender violated the Equal Protection Clause. A plurality of the Court applied strict scrutiny, which would require that the classification be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. Four other justices reached the same conclusion, applying a less searching middle-tier scrutiny under which the classification must be closely related to the fulfillment of an important governmental interest. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, contending that the Court should defer to Congress’s policy choices in the area of military rules and regulations. Frontiero clearly departs from the judicial deference evident in Weiss.

The Bill of Rights

Although the extent to which the Bill of Rights applies to members of the armed forces remains controversial, several of its protections are either explicitly or implicitly inapplicable. Additionally, a number of rights that Americans take for granted are either denied to members of the armed services or offered only in a limited way. In United States ex rel. French v. Weeks (1922), the Court found that a member of the armed services is “subject to military law, and the principles of that law, as provided by Congress, [constitute] for him due process of law in a constitutional sense.”

Aside from due process rights, members of the armed services have fewer rights with respect to free speech and political participation. For example, Article 88 of the UCMJ proscribes the use of “contemptuous words” against the president and other high political officials, and Articles 133 (proscribing conduct unbecoming) and 134 (the general article, proscribing service-discrediting conduct) may be used to prosecute disloyal statements. Rights to demonstrate and affiliate with advocacy groups, especially extremist groups or hate groups, which would be protected for civilians, are restricted for military service members. Similar First Amendment restrictions that would be unthinkable in a civilian context have been held constitutional. For example, the Military Honor and Decency Act, which prohibits the sale or rental of sexually explicit materials at military exchanges, was held constitutional in a lower court in General Media Communications v. Cohen in 1997.

The Court also found that religious practices or beliefs cannot excuse compliance with military regulations, such as those governing uniform standards. For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), the Court upheld a ban on wearing headgear indoors as applied to a Jewish officer who wanted to wear a yarmulke. However, in 2017, the Army issued Directive 2017-03, revising its grooming and uniform policy (AR 670-1) to allow greater religious and cultural expression among service members. Under the directive, female soldiers are now permitted to wear locks, provided they are neat and professional.  Soldiers may seek permanent religious accommodations to wear beards, yarmulkes, turbans, under-turbans, and other religious head coverings, while female soldiers may wear hijabs. Religious headgear must be modest in size, color, and design, not interfering with military headgear or equipment. Additionally, head coverings should not obstruct vision, interfere with equipment, or compromise military readiness or unit cohesion. These accommodations no longer require approval only at the brigade-level command; many uniform and grooming accommodation requests are handled at the general court-martial convening authority level.

Equal Protection

Even though racial classifications are subject to the “most rigid scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that wartime necessities allow a military commander to issue a racially based curfew in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943). Similarly, in Korematsu v. United States (1944), the Court upheld the forced relocation and incarceration of more than 100,000 Japanese Americans as constitutional, prioritizing claimed national security over civil rights. This line of reasoning has been widely discredited, and in 2018, the Supreme Court stated that Korematsu was “gravely wrong” and has no place in constitutional law. In addition to restrictions based on race, the Court allowed sex-based discrimination by upholding male-only draft registration in Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) and a naval officer promotion program that provided advantages to women over men in Schlesinger v. Ballard (1975). Likewise, privacy rights in the military enjoy a more limited scope than under the Court’s civilian precedents. For example, a court of military appeals in 1990 upheld the issuance of “safe sex” orders to military personnel infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).

Some provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the Fifth Amendment, expressly exempt members of the military from components of the amendment’s scope. Military service members are not exempt from all aspects of the Fifth Amendment, but the application of its rights is adjusted to fit the distinct mission and structure of the armed forces. Courts have consistently ruled that some constitutional protections may be applied differently in military settings, especially when military necessity and discipline are at stake. The Fifth Amendment excepts from its coverage “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.” The Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury has been treated similarly by implication in Ex parte Milligan (1866). While the essence of these rights remains intact, aspects such as jury selection and trial procedures are tailored to meet the unique disciplinary and operational needs of the armed forces. Courts have generally upheld these modifications as constitutionally valid due to the distinct nature of military service.

In Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. (1948), the Court held that Congress’s war power could extend beyond the cessation of hostilities to address the war’s immediate consequences. Case law, as well as the text of the Constitution, confirms Justice Harold H. Burton’s observation that “we have a fighting constitution” in the opinion for Lichter v. United States (1948). The war powers of the national government embrace not only the power to fight but also “the power to wage war successfully,” according to Charles Evans Hughes in Hirabayashi. Consequently, in the Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), the Court upheld conscription, involuntary military service, and the use of state militias to fight against foreign enemies abroad and rejected the notion that military service is “involuntary servitude” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.

The Civil War

A major period of conflict between the Court and the military occurred during and immediately after the Civil War. Several cases taxed the independence and agility of the judiciary by implicitly or explicitly questioning the constitutionality of congressional Reconstruction and pitting the Court against the Radical Republican Congress. The stage was set by the Court’s ruling in Ex parte Milligan that civilians could not be tried by military courts or commissions in peacetime when civilian courts were open and functioning. The much later case of Ex parte Quirin (1942) involved eight German saboteurs, including Herbert Hans Haupt, who were captured in the US during World War II. This case differed from previous examples as the Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try the men, ruling that because they had entered the US secretly to commit sabotage, they were unlawful enemy combatants. The Court found that even US citizens, like Haupt, could be subject to military trial if they engaged in acts of war against the United States in violation of the laws of war.

Like Milligan’s case, the cases of Ex parte McCardle (1868) and Ex parte Yerger (1869) both involved trials before military commissions. Their trials had occurred long after the cessation of hostilities and during the period of congressional Reconstruction. McCardle was a Mississippi newspaper editor who vituperatively attacked Reconstruction, and Yerger was an accused murderer. Both sought review in the Court by writ of habeas corpus. Resolution of the merits of their attacks on the validity of military jurisdiction and Reconstruction was avoided by a ruling in McCardle’s case that the particular habeas statute on which his petition was grounded had been repealed by Congress before a decision in his case, thus revoking the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over his case and by Yerger’s release from custody to stand trial before a civilian court.

Two other attempts to bring the matter of congressional Reconstruction before the Court directly also failed on justiciability grounds. The resolution of these cases prevented a major contest between the Court and the military. Two other cases, Mississippi v. Johnson (1867), in which the Court held that it lacked the power to enjoin a president, and Georgia v. Stanton (1868), which held that a suit by a state raised a political question, concluded the post-Civil War power struggle. In the end, the Court never ruled on the validity of military rule during Reconstruction. New cases before the Supreme Court continue to raise questions about the limits of military authority over civilians and the scope of habeas corpus, showing that these issues remain unresolved.

In the early 2000s, the Supreme Court issued a series of landmark decisions that clarified the legal rights of individuals detained as enemy combatants in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In Rasul v. Bush (2004), the Court held that foreign detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the right to seek habeas corpus relief in US courts under the federal habeas statute. That same year, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Court ruled that US citizens designated as enemy combatants are entitled to due process protections, including the right to challenge their detention before a neutral decision-maker. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the Court found that the military commissions established to try detainees lacked adequate procedural safeguards and violated both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. Collectively, these cases reinforced the principle that even in matters of national security, the rule of law and constitutional guarantees must be upheld. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of habeas corpus in national security cases, holding that challenges to detention under wartime authority must be brought through proper habeas petitions, without fully resolving the scope of executive power.


Bibliography

Bishop, Joseph W., Jr., Justice Under Fire: A Study of Military Law. Charterhouse, 1974.

Borch, Frederick L. Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti. Office of the Judge Advocate General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 2001.

Fairman, Charles. Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888. Cambridge UP, 2010.

“Federal Court in New York Blocks Removals Under Alien Enemies Act.” ACLU, 6 May 2025, www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-in-new-york-blocks-removals-under-alien-enemies-act. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

Henning, Anna C. “Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Over Military Court Cases.” Congress Research Service, 5 Mar. 2009, sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL34697.pdf. Accessed 14 Apr. 2025.

Hinnershitz, Stephanie. “Korematsu v. United States: 80 Years Later.” The National WWII Museum, 7 Nov. 2024, www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/korematsu-v-united-states. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

Lurie, Jonathan. Arming Military Justice: Origins of the United States Court of Military Appeals, 1775-1950. Princeton UP, 1992.

Lurie, Jonathan. Pursuing Military Justice: The History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 1951-1980. Princeton UP, 1998.

Sanchez, Gabriella. “Landmark Supreme Court Cases.” Brennan Center for Justice, 7 Oct. 2024, www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/landmark-supreme-court-cases. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

Shanor, Charles A., and L. Lynn Hogue. Military Law in a Nutshell. 4th ed., West Publishing, 2013.

“United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.” United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, www.armfor.uscourts.gov/. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

United States Department of Defense. DOD Instruction 1300.17: Religious Liberty in the Military Service. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 1 Sept. 2020, www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130017p.pdf. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

United States Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, docket no. 24-83, 26 July 2024, supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-83/320878/20240726151524849_20240726-151250-95763056-00002416.pdf. PDF file. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

“US ex rel Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922).” FindLaw, caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/259/336.html. Accessed 9 Apr. 2026.

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