Spratly Islands

Summary: The Spratly Islands comprise a collection of up to 250 tiny islands and reefs spread over a wide area of the South China Sea west of the Philippines, east of Vietnam, south of China, and north of Malaysia. China and Taiwan claim sovereignty over all of the Spratly Islands. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim some of them. These competing claims, which led to hostilities in the 1990s, have also led to competing claims of "exclusive economic zones" stretching 200 miles off the claimed islands to exploit resources (oil, natural gas, and fishing rights). Most of the Spratly Islands rise only fifteen to twenty feet above sea level. The combined land area of all the islands is about four square miles. The only inhabitants are soldiers stationed on military bases. The islands lie in the midst of one of the world's busiest shipping routes, giving them strategic importance. In 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China negotiated an agreement to settle future disputes over the Spratly peacefully.

The Spratly Islands are an archipelago of as many as 250 islands and reefs in the southern South China Sea, west of the Philippines and east of Vietnam. Some or all of the islands are variously claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Most of the islands comprise reefs no more than fifteen to twenty feet above water. The combined land area of all the Spratlys is about four square miles, spread across an area of about 70,000 square miles (roughly the size of Missouri). 

The presence of significant offshore oil and gas reserves around the Spratly Islands is widely judged to be the islands' most significant aspect, although estimates of available resources vary widely. According to some Chinese estimates, the region around the islands may comprise the world's fourth-largest oil field. Western estimates tend to be much more modest and concentrate on prospective natural gas discoveries. Rapid economic growth, especially by China, makes the Spratlys and the South China Sea a region of potential conflict in an era of tightening oil supplies and rapid economic growth in East Asia. 

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing into the 2020s, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have all moved to exercise mineral claims in the region. These overlapping claims have occasionally led to armed conflicts, as well as overlapping agreements with foreign oil companies to explore for oil and natural gas. 

Faced with the prospect of future conflicts over competing claims, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed in 2002 to a non-binding "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea." In March 2005, the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam signed a joint accord to cooperate in exploring for oil in the islands.  

"Exclusive Economic Zones"

One basis for claims to mineral rights in the Spratly Islands is found in the concept of "exclusive economic zones" (EEZ) created by the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), passed in 1982 and since ratified by states in the region (but not Taiwan). UNCLOS gave coastal states the right to claim national boundaries up to twelve miles out to sea. It also established rights to "exclusive economic zones" (EEZ) up to 200 miles offshore. Inside these zones, coastal states could claim "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to" (above) "the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil." The convention also states that "rocks" unable to sustain habitation did not carry rights to an exclusive economic zone. 

In the case of the Spratly Islands, the EEZs of five nations claiming sovereignty - the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, China, and Taiwan - overlap, and all five nations have moved to exploit economic resources within these overlapping zones, most notably granting exploration licenses to foreign oil companies. In 1984, Brunei claimed an exclusive economic zone for fishing rights in the southern Spratly Islands but made no territorial claim to the offshore reefs. The UNCLOS did not address situations in which EEZs overlap. UNCLOS technically excludes from claims of sovereignty "rocks" incapable of sustaining human habitation but leaves it up to each nation to decide whether a given speck in the waters is a rock or an island. This aspect of UNCLOS has prompted some states surrounding the South China Sea to establish military bases on tiny islands to assert their habitability, i.e., their status as islands. Such bases, in turn, have led to conflicts between rival claimants. China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam all maintain military garrisons on some islands, as does Taiwan. 

All countries with claims to the Spratly Inlands except Taiwan have ratified the UNCLOS: the Philippines in 1984, Vietnam in 1994, Brunei, China, and Malaysia in 1996. 

Competing claims

Although the Spratly Islands are too small and barren to support self-sustaining settlements, prospects of exploiting the surrounding area for hydrocarbons have prompted the four countries bordering on the South China Sea to stake claims on the islands. 

• China, in 1992, passed its Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones law, which laid claim to all the Spratly Islands, as well as other archipelagos, such as the Paracels, north of the Spratly Islands. To support its claim, China also cites documents, including maps dating as far back as the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), that are said to refer to the islands as being under Chinese sovereignty, as well as to the discovery of ancient Chinese coins and pottery on some of the islands. Skeptics observe that similar Chinese documentation could be used to claim modern Vietnam, part of the Philippines, and Malaysia. 

• The Philippines claimed part of the Spratly Islands, in the eastern South China Sea, as its territory at the time of independence in 1946. Ten years later, Tomas Cloma, a Philippines lawyer, claimed to have founded a new state, Kalayaan (Freedom Land), based on fifty-three islands and reefs in a shallow part of the South China Sea and went to the United Nations to defend the claim. He also asked the Philippines to declare his new country a protectorate. Although the new state was not endorsed by the government in Manila, surrounding states regarded it as an act of aggression by the Philippines, and Manila sent troops to some islands to protect the "citizens" of Kalayaan. In 1971, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos announced his country had annexed Kalayaan. 

• Vietnam, like China, bases its claims to some of the Spratly Islands on history, specifically seventeenth-century maps showing surveys of the geography and resources of islands off the Vietnamese coast. Vietnam claimed some of the islands during the 1951 conference that drew up the final peace treaty ending World War II. At that conference, Japan formally ceded any claims to the Spratlys. No other conference participants contested Vietnam's claims. 

• Malaysia claims three "islands" and four "rock" groups in the Spratlys, including Swallow's Reef. This reef was essentially built by Malaysia by pouring sand between two smaller submerged reefs. The site has since become a premier site for scuba divers. Malaysia stations five soldiers there. 

• Taiwan also claims all the Spratlys, partly because of its fishing interests in the area. Taiwanese fishing boats use one island as a rest stop. In 1956, Taiwanese troops occupied the largest of the Spratly Islands, named Peace Island (also called "Itu Aba" and "Thai Binh"). The Taiwanese navy has guarded the island since the end of World War II and maintains a permanent garrison there. 

Spratly Islands and Energy Resources

The prospect of finding significant oil and natural gas resources under the South China Sea adjacent to the Spratlys has long been credited with the competing territorial interests of surrounding countries. Estimates of these resources vary widely. In 2003, for example, the US Energy Department estimated prospective oil production for the Spratlys at around 180,000 barrels per day, whereas Chinese estimates ranged up to 10 times that volume (1.9 million barrels a day). American estimates also suggest that natural gas, rather than oil, is the most likely energy source in the Spratlys. In 2023, the US Energy Information Agency estimated the South China Sea might harbor as much as 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas but only considered proven and probable reserves. Further, these resources are believed to lie along the margins of the South China Sea and not under the disputed islands.

Vietnam has had producing offshore oil wells since 1991. In 1992, three months after passing the law laying claim to the Spratlys, China's National Offshore Oil Corp. contracted with the Crestone Energy Corp. of the United States for joint offshore oil exploration. In 1996, Vietnam granted exploration rights to the Conoco oil company in a region that overlaps China's deal with Crestone. These are but two examples of ongoing conflicts over the rights to hydrocarbon resources in the area of the Spratlys. 

"Sea Lines of Communication"

Apart from energy resources, the Spratlys are also at the center of so-called Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) - the ability to control shipping that passes through the archipelago. The islands lie in one of the world's busiest sea routes, linking China and Japan to India, the Middle East, and Africa. Vast quantities of cargo and oil pass through the islands, some of which are no more than threats to navigation. For example, 70 percent of Japan's imported oil passes through the South China Sea near the Spratlys. Thus, control of the islands could result in a significant strategic advantage. Some observers attribute this motive, as much as acquiring energy resources, to China's continuing assertion of sovereignty over the Spratlys. 

Southeast Asia Regional Politics

Since the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, the dynamics of the disputes over control of the Spratlys have taken a less confrontational character. In 2005 the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam agreed to cooperate in exploring for oil. Regional discussions about the Spratlys have excluded the United States. Some analysts have suggested that the issue of the Spratlys is part of China's ongoing effort to dominate a region at the expense of the United States. On the other hand, member-states of ASEAN may rely on American naval power to counter rising Chinese military and economic power, including a buildup of the "blue water" Chinese navy. 

In the 2020s, the Spratly Islands remain the subject of conflicting territorial claims. The area remained claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In the late 2010s, as China’s claims became more aggressive, the Philippines sought the guidance of the UN for help in arbitrating the disagreement. In 2016, the UN found that China’s historical claims to the islands were not legitimate, and under the Law of the Oceans, no country could claim the islands despite whatever projects had been built as they remained rocks and not islands. 

In the 2020s, China's increasingly aggressive posture in the area elevated the Spratly Islands to a global flashpoint. As China sought to become the signature nation-state in the world, the South China Sea was a venue and an opportunity to project its preeminent status and to establish this zone as a sphere of influence. The Chinese government was more frequently using its military forces, particularly its navy, to aggressively enforce its territorial claims.

In the 2020s, confrontations between Chinese coast guard ships and those of the Philippine navy and civilian crafts were frequent events. Typical actions included Chinese ships intentionally ramming Philippine boats, dousing them with water cannons, and directing high-powered lasers against Philippine crew members. 

The United States had, for decades, countered Chinese territorial assertions. In the mid-2010s and 2020s, the US sought to refortify historical alliances, such as with Australia and the Philippines, and to forge new ones with its former adversary, Vietnam. These actions counteracted China's increasingly aggressive stance toward the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea.  

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